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Abstract
The provision of Relative Performance Information (RPI) is commonly used by firms to increase the performance of their em-
ployees. In case employees have to fulfil tasks that involve multiple dimensions, firms have to decide on the dimensionality of
RPI and can basically choose between unidimensional and multidimensional Performance Information. I discuss behavioural
effects of unidimensional and multidimensional RPI under different compensation schemes and apply a controlled laboratory
experiment to empirically test the influence of the dimensionality of RPI on performance and attention towards task dimen-
sions. The study demonstrates that solely the provision of unidimensional RPI improves performance in multidimensional task
settings while the effects for multidimensional RPI are small and insignificant. Importantly, both unidimensional and multidi-
mensional RPI imply a negative effect on the performance of participants with a low position in the provided ranking on overall
performance. Additionally, the application of performance-based compensation negatively moderates the performance impact
of both forms of RPI which though seem to be especially critical for multidimensional RPI. In this regard, multidimensional RPI
induces a significant performance decrease compared to unidimensional RPI in the presence of a performance-based contract.
The findings provide some indication that a distortion of attention toward the ‘quantity’ dimension of the applied experimental
task may have caused the negative performance effect. Notably, the experimental results do not indicate increased learning
effects regarding a task-specific strategy under multidimensional as compared to unidimensional RPI. Overall, no significant
differences in attention towards task dimensions between the two forms of RPI can be shown.
Keywords: Relative performance information, Incentive schemes, Multidimensional tasks, Social comparison theory,
Competition, Feedback
1. Introduction
Firms frequently provide relative performance informa-
tion (RPI) to their employees in order to show them how
well they are performing in comparison to their peers. The
general intuition is that such competitive feedback can in-
crease employee motivation and performance even when it
is not linked to monetary rewards.1 In recent years, RPI has
played a fundamental role in firms’ attempts to improve the
productivity of their workforce through the ‘gamification’ of
tasks.2 This technique refers to the use of ‘game design ele-
ments in non-game contexts’.3 For instance, employees can
earn points for the completion of tasks while their respective
scores are compared with that of their peers in public perfor-
mance rankings on virtual leaderboards.4
Performance comparisons between employees can be
potentially based on several performance metrics since
many jobs in today’s business world either involve multi-
ple tasks within a single job description or single tasks with
multiple dimensions.5 Exemplary for the latter are customer
care jobs in hotel reservation centre where employees may
3Deterding et al. (2011), p. 9
4Cf. Meder et al. (2013), p. 490.
5Cf. Colombino et al. (2012), p. 294; The Economist (2012b); Brown
et al. (2014), p. 240.
1Cf. Reeves and Read (2013); Silverman (2011); Nordstrom et al.
(1991).
2Cf. Werbach and Hunter (2012); Reeves and Read (2013); The 
Economist (2012a).
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be ranked according to the performance dimensions ‘num-
ber of bookings handled’ as well as ‘average value of handled
bookings’.6 As indicated by this case, multidimensional task
settings normally confront employees with a trade-off in
attention allocation since attention spend on one task di-
mension cannot simultaneously expended toward another.7
Clearly, the more time employees in a hotel reservation cen-
tre spend on each customer in order to increase the value of
the booking, the lower is the number of bookings they can
handle in a period of time. This implies that performance
rankings on different performance dimensions in multidi-
mensional task settings are interdependent.
Multidimensional tasks, like they are relevant in hotel
reservation centre, are present across various industries and
functions. In the banking sector, for example, important out-
put dimensions of tellers’ performance are ‘number of new
accounts opened’ as well as ‘average amount of funds in these
accounts’. Also, in the field of software development, on-
line programming contests that are organized by firms like
TopCoder Inc. measure the number of problems accurately
solved by the developer in a given time period but differ-
entiate point values according to the chosen problem diffi-
culty.8 An important characteristic of the described multidi-
mensional task settings is that performance in the different
task dimensions can be aggregated into one overall perfor-
mance measure. This performance measure may be for in-
stance the total expected revenue that an employee in a hotel
reservation centre generates as well as the total funds in the
new accounts opened by a banks’ teller or the productivity of
a developer in a programming contest. In this respect, vari-
ous combinations of dimension-specific performance can im-
ply a certain level of overall performance. Therefore, as long
as firms are only interested in the maximization of overall
performance, they have per se no preference on how employ-
ees allocate attention towards the different task dimensions.
However, since employees may differ in their abilities to per-
form various task dimensions, performance can significantly
depend on an appropriate attention allocation. Thus, con-
cerning the provision of RPI in multidimensional task setting,
potential effects on employees’ alignment between attention
allocation and individual abilities have to be considered.
With respect to the characterized multidimensional
task setting, firms have the opportunity to provide their
employees with unidimensional or multidimensional RPI.
Whereas unidimensional RPI compares peer performance
on the overall performance measure that aggregates the dif-
ferent task dimensions, multidimensional RPI additionally
includes comparative information regarding the dimension-
specific performance. Based on this differentiation, it arises
the question if and how the effects of RPI on performance
and attention allocation are determined by its dimensional-
ity. In this regard, prior literature on RPI only offers limited
6Cf. Berger et al. (2011), p. 5.
7Cf. Hannan et al. (2013), p. 554; Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), p.
25.
8Boudreau et al. (2012), p. 4-6; TopCoder (2014).
insights into its behavioural effects in multidimensional task
environments. Although several experimental studies have
generated informative findings on the performance impact
of RPI, these mainly relate to task settings with one perfor-
mance dimension and therefore do not consider a potential
influence of RPI on attention allocation.9
Recent work of Hannan et al. (2013) indicates that prior
findings on the performance effects of RPI cannot be sim-
ply generalized to a task environment with multiple perfor-
mance dimensions. Specifically, the study suggests that em-
ployees which have to work on multiple tasks may start shift-
ing their attention to one task when they are provided with
task-specific RPI. Since the study is concerned with a setting
in which a firm prefers equal effort on the tasks, the results
imply that the provision of RPI on multiple tasks can impede
overall performance improvements although employees are
motivated to exert higher effort. Therewith, the findings em-
phasize the importance of research on the behavioural effects
of RPI in task settings which imply that performance is not
only determined by the motivated level of effort but also by
the induced attention towards different performance dimen-
sions. However, the work of Hannan et al. (2013) does not
apply to the effects of RPI in situations where performance is
not a matter of firm-preferred allocations, but is rather deter-
mined by the extent to which employees’ attention towards
task dimensions corresponds to their individual abilities.
Against this background, the goal of this study is to ex-
plore how the presence and the dimensionality of RPI affect
performance and attention towards task dimensions in mul-
tidimensional task settings. In particular, the study aims to
compare the effects of unidimensional RPI with that of multi-
dimensional RPI. Following to insights of prior research, the
effects are studied under different compensation schemes.
Even when financial incentives are not tied to relative per-
formance, they may still have a moderating influence on the
behavioural effects of RPI. For instance, Tafkov (2013) indi-
cates that the motivational effects of RPI are greater under
an individual performance-based contract than under a flat-
wage contract.10 Moreover, research investigating the design
of incentive contracts in multidimensional task environments
suggest that financial rewards influence an employee’s de-
cision on how to allocate attention between different task
dimensions.11 Therefore, the study compares the effects of
unidimensional and multidimensional RPI under flat wage
compensation as well as under a performance-based contract
which links financial rewards to overall task performance.
In order to address the outlined research interest, chapter
2 firstly analyses behavioural effects of RPI theoretically and
presents related empirical findings. Specifically, motivational
as well as learning effects of RPI may affect performance and
attention allocation and are therefore examined in general
9E.g. Hannan et al. (2008); Azmat and Iriberri (2010); Tran and Zeck-
hauser (2012); Tafkov (2013).
10Cf. Tafkov (2013).
11Cf. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991); Feltham and Xie (1994);
Kachelmeier et al. (2008).
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and with regard to multidimensional task settings. In addi-
tion, the influence of different compensation schemes on the
motivational effects of RPI is considered. In the following,
chapter 3 derives hypotheses and research questions which
are tested within a controlled laboratory experiment. Chap-
ter 4 details the methodical approach by outlining the char-
acteristics of experimental research in general and explaining
the applied experimental design as well as the experimental
procedures. Thereafter, the results of the conducted labora-
tory experiment are reported and discussed in chapter 5. Fi-
nally, chapter 6 concludes the study and refers to its possible
limitations as well as to opportunities for future research.
2. Behavioural effects of Relative Performance Informa-
tion (RPI)
2.1. Motivational effects of RPI
2.1.1. Motivational effects of RPI in general
From a social-psychological perspective, the provision of
RPI relates to the fundamental human social interaction pro-
cess of social comparison – RPI represents social comparison
information which enable a comparison between the self and
others.12 A theory of social comparison processes was first
proposed by Festinger (1954) in succession of his theory of
informal social communication, which emphasizes the influ-
ence of social groups on the formation of opinions. According
to social comparison theory, individuals use others not only
to fulfil their internal need to evaluate their opinions but also
to gain knowledge about their own abilities.13 In his semi-
nal theory, Festinger (1954) hypothesizes that the internal
need for social comparison is motivated by the basic drive
to maintain an accurate self-evaluation. Since clear objec-
tive standards for such evaluations are not always available,
accurate assessments of one’s ability rely on the comparison
with other persons.14
The social comparison processes induced by the provision
of RPI are of particular relevance for the current analysis
since they are expected to increase an individual’s motiva-
tion to successfully perform a certain task.15 Festinger (1954)
states that engagement in social comparison evokes a ‘drive
upward’ that implies an ‘undirectional push to do better and
12Cf. Guimond (2006), p. 13; Corcoran et al. (2011), p. 119.
13Cf. Festinger (1954); Festinger (1950); Suls and Wheeler (2000).
14Cf. Festinger (1954), p. 119.
15It should be noted that alternative theoretical approaches exist which
may serve to predict a positive effect of RPI on individuals’ motivation. Ma-
jor examples are the following: 1) Based on goal- setting theory (cf. Locke
and Latham (1990)), the provision of RPI increases motivation as it in-
duces goal setting (e.g. achieving a high position in a performance ranking.
2) Preference-based theories hypothesize that individuals have competitive
preferences and therefore derive utility or disutility from the provision of RPI
as it informs them that their performance is superior or inferior to that of
their peers (cf. Charness and Rabin (2002); Charness and Grosskopf (2001);
Kandel and Lazear (1992)). In this context, also status-seeking preferences
are of relevance which imply that status concerns for a higher rank can drive
motivation under the provision of RPI (e.g. Congleton (1989); Moldovanu
and amd X. Shi (2007)).
better’16 which interrelates with the aim of reducing discrep-
ancies between oneself relative to others. These two forms of
pressure manifest in competitive behaviour described as ‘ac-
tion to protect one’s superiority’17 which is associated with
higher effort and increased performance. Therefore, related
research constitute that social comparison can not only serve
self-evaluation but also the motives of self-improvement as
well as self-enhancement which reflect the desire to improve
oneself and to protect or enhance one’s self-esteem.18
Against this background and with respect to the large
body of research that has evolved on social comparison, a
more in-depth analysis is required in order to understand
how the provision of RPI can affect motivation through so-
cial comparison. First, it is of interest to whom people com-
pare themselves so as to examine requirements and charac-
teristics of social comparison. Originally, the theory of Fes-
tinger (1954) poses that social comparison involvement re-
quires that comparison standards are similar regarding the
critical dimension. This implies that people do not compare
themselves to others that have too divergent abilities.19 Sub-
sequent research added the factor of the similarity on related
attributes such as age or educational background. Related
attributes influence the performance on the critical dimen-
sion and therefore performance differences could be ascribed
to them rather than to the ability on the critical dimension.
Overall, the selection of similar standards is required to fulfil
the motivational aspect of accurate self-evaluation.20
Another more detailed aspect of the question to whom
people compare themselves is the direction of comparison
which also addresses an individual’s level of aspiration in a
social comparison process. In this context, the social compar-
ison literature fundamentally distinguishes between upward
and downward comparison.21 Based on his central tenet of
a ‘drive upward’, Festinger (1954) predicts that people com-
pare themselves upwards with others who are of slightly
better ability.22 Wheeler (1966) strengthens the concept of
upward comparison by introducing the rank order paradigm,
stating that people compare themselves in a performance
ranking to those ones who rank most similar yet higher.
Concerning the motives of social comparison, upward com-
parison is directed towards the fulfilment of the need for
self-improvement as it ‘can provide hope and inspiration’.23
However, it may also negatively affect self-enhancement and
the related motive of self-evaluation maintenance.24 On the
basis of this argument, research by Brickman and Bulman
16Festinger (1954), p. 125.
17Festinger (1954), p. 126.
18Cf. Wood (1989), p. 232; Brown et al. (2007), pp. 60-61.
19Cf. Festinger (1954), p. 120.
20Cf. Wheeler (1966); Goethals and Darley (1977); Corcoran et al.
(2011).
21Cf. Wheeler (1966); Garcia and Tor (2007); Brown et al. (2007).
22Cf. Festinger (1954), pp. 126-127; Wheeler (1966), p. 27.
23Cf. Suls et al. (2002), p. 161.
24Cf. Corcoran et al. (2011), p. 124; Tesser (1988) introduces the self-
evaluation maintenance model which hypothesizes that individuals strive
for the maintenance or increase of self- evaluation.
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(1977) bring up the idea of downward comparison, argu-
ing that comparisons with better performing counterparts
are avoided because of the implied threatening to the self-
view.25 Wills (1981) and Taylor et al. (1983) further develop
this idea and describe downward comparison as a process
which enables people to increase their subjective well-being
through comparisons with ‘lower status targets’. In contrast
to upward comparison, it reflects a process aimed to serve
the motives of self-enhancement and self-evaluation mainte-
nance.26
Based on the differentiation between upward and down-
ward comparison, the question arises of how the direction
of social comparison influences motivation. As past research
found out, there is no clear answer to it because the affective
outcome of a comparison does not depend on its direction
but rather on its salient implication. More precisely, a com-
parison can imply an assimilative or a contrastive evaluation
of the comparison target. Assimilation refers to the belief
that one could achieve the same status as the comparison
target whereas a contrast in social comparison emphasizes
the separation between oneself and the target.27 Therefore,
an assimilation is likely to inspire an individual and to in-
crease motivation in an upward comparison, but can on the
other hand cause demotivation in case of a downward com-
parison. A contrast, however, has the opposite effect in up-
ward comparisons because it may foster negative feelings of
the own inferiority and lack of ability. In downward compari-
son, it engenders positive feelings of relief which can spur the
motivation for further performance improvement. Overall,
assimilation effects are expected to be predominant in com-
parisons because large differences between the self and the
other typically lead to the cessation of social comparison.28
Nevertheless, social comparison often entails moderate dif-
ferences and prior research has identified various factors that
influence whether assimilative or contrastive evaluations are
implied by a comparison.29 Commonly, it is stated that as-
similation is facilitated by feelings of ‘we-ness’ through the
identification and psychological closeness to the comparison
target. Consequently, contrast is promoted by contrary feel-
ings of ‘I-ness’ which are determined by factors stimulating
the salience of a personal self in opposition to a social self.30
In his classic paper on the theory of social comparison
processes, Festinger (1954) assumes that discrepancies in
abilities between oneself and a comparison target result
in a ‘pressure toward uniformity’, which implies assimila-
tion.31 Building on this assumption, individuals that engage
in upward social comparison are expected to behave com-
25Cf. Brickman and Bulman (1977).
26Cf. Wills (1981), pp. 245-246; Taylor et al. (1983), pp. 20-21; Tesser
(1988), p. 5.
27Cf. Suls et al. (2002), pp. 161-162; Brown et al. (2007), p. 62.
28Cf. Collins (2000), p. 159; Mussweiler (2003), p. 474; Festinger
(1954), p. 120.
29E.g. Mussweiler (2001); Stapel and Koomen (2005); Collins (2000).
30Cf. Stapel and Koomen (2005), p. 1037; Collins (2000), pp. 159-160.;
Corcoran et al. (2011), p. 128.
31Cf. Festinger (1954), p. 126; Corcoran et al. (2011), p. 121.
petitively based on their motivation to improve oneself as
well as their desire to maintain a positive self-image and to
protect self-esteem.32 However, research has identified sev-
eral variables that impact the relationship between upward
social comparison and competitive behaviour. Historically,
three main variables are emphasized that are closely related
to the factors that facilitate assimilation. First, competitive
behaviour can be intensified through the commensurability
of the comparison which refers to the degree of similarity
on related attributes between oneself and the comparison
target.33 Second, the psychological closeness to the com-
parison counterpart typically fosters competitive behaviour
as it confronts an individual with a greater threat to self-
evaluation maintenance.34 Third, the higher the relevance
of a performance dimension to an individual’s self-definition
and therefore to self-evaluation maintenance, the stronger
may be the induced competitive behaviour.35 Whereas all
of these variables are highly dependent on the involved in-
dividuals, recent literature has also suggested additional
situational factors that determine the relationship between
social comparison and competitive behaviour. Examples in-
clude the number of counterparts in a comparison process
but also the proximity of a meaningful standard for com-
parison, like the number one of a performance ranking or
another relevant performance threshold. In this context,
competitive behaviour is expected to increase as the number
of comparison counterparts decreases and the proximity to
a meaningful standard gets higher.36 Overall, these find-
ings illustrate how the strength of the motivational effects of
RPI and the related competitive behaviour are determined
by a variety of factors which shape the underlying social
comparison.
2.1.2. Motivational effects of RPI in multidimensional task set-
tings
So far, the analysis has applied to the basic social compar-
ison processes and their behavioural consequences accompa-
nying the provision of RPI in general. Building on this foun-
dation, this section examines additional motivational effects
of RPI which can arise in multidimensional task settings. As
illustrated in the introduction of this study, settings in which
employees have to perform tasks which include multiple
performance dimensions are ubiquitous in today’s business
environment. Importantly, they confront employees with a
trade-off in attention allocation since attention spend on one
task dimension cannot simultaneously expended toward an-
other.37 In this regard, overall performance can significantly
32Cf. Tesser (1988); Beach and Tesser (1995); Wood (1989); Brown et al.
(2007).
33Cf. Garcia and Tor (2007), p. 98; cf. Goethals and Darley (1977).
34Cf. Tesser (1988), p. 5; Garcia and Tor (2007), p. 98.
35Cf. Festinger (1954), p. 130; Tesser (1988), p. 6; Garcia and Tor (2007),
p. 98.
36Cf. Garcia et al. (2006); Garcia and Tor (2007); Garcia and Tor (2009);
Additional situational factors ana- lysed by Poortvliet et al. (2009); Tor et al.
(2013).
37Cf. Hannan et al. (2013), p. 554; Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), p.
25.
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depend on an appropriate attention allocation based on an
individual’s dimension-specific abilities. Thus, it is of spe-
cial interest for this study how motivational effects induced
by the use of RPI can influence an employee’s decision on
how to allocate attention between multiple task dimensions.
Particularly, a distinction was made between unidimensional
RPI that solely compares overall performance and multi-
dimensional RPI which additionally provides comparative
information on dimension-specific performance. Following
this differentiation, the analysis first draws on findings on
motivational effects based on self-affirmation theory and
considers the social-psychological phenomenon of social
distinction. It then continues the examination of the mo-
tivational impact of RPI in multidimensional task settings by
analysing the influence of different competitive attitudes.
Self-affirmation tendencies and the desire for social distinction
Self-affirmation theory is built on the assumption that
people are driven by a strong motivation to maintain per-
ceived self-integrity.38 By definition, self-integrity is ‘the
sense that, on the whole, one is a good and appropriate per-
son’39 and its evaluation is shaped by culturally or socially
significant standards of integrity. Threats to an individual’s
perceived self-integrity can arise in different forms, including
negative social comparisons which may lower self-evaluation
as well as self-esteem and therefore affect self-integrity.40
Self-affirmation theory focuses on the behavioural responses
to such threats, aiming to restore a state of integrity. Over-
all, people can respond to a threat by the acceptance of
the threatening information and corresponding behavioural
changes. However, in case the threat relates to an important
part of self-integrity, it might lead to defensive psycholog-
ical adaptions such as the denial or the avoidance of the
threat. In this context, self-affirmation theory suggests an
alternative to defensive adaptations, namely an indirect psy-
chological adaptation of affirming other resources of self-
integrity.41 This implies that people can compensate a threat
to self-integrity in one area by emphasizing successes in other
areas.42
As already stated, negative social comparison experiences
are a potential source for threats toward self-integrity. Yet,
based on self-affirmation theory, such a threat may be com-
pensated by a positive social comparison in another domain
to the extent that it enables the affirmation of an impor-
tant self-aspect.43 This insight has important implications for
the motivational effects of RPI in multidimensional task set-
tings. In such settings, multidimensional RPI – as opposed
to unidimensional RPI – involves social comparison informa-
38Cf. Steele (1988); Aronson et al. (1999); Sherman and Cohen (2006).
39Sherman and Cohen (2006), p. 185; cf. Steele (1988).
40Cf. Tesser et al. (2000) for a detailed analysis of the relationship be-
tween the concepts of self-esteem and self-integrity.
41Cf. Sherman and Cohen (2006), pp. 186-187; Aronson et al. (1999),
pp. 128-129.
42Cf. Sherman and Cohen (2006), p. 188.
43Cf. Leary and Tangney (2005), p. 287; Sherman and Cohen (2006), p.
190.
tion which allow people to compare themselves with others
on the basis of different dimensions of a task. Thereby, self-
threatening social comparison in one dimension can trigger
self-affirming tendencies in another dimension.44 As a con-
sequence, in the presence of multidimensional RPI, people
may be motivated to concentrate their attention on a task
dimension in which they can proof their competence. This
might lead to a distortion of attention in terms of an unde-
sirable shift of attention toward one task dimension and the
neglect of other dimensions at the expense of overall perfor-
mance. In contrast, unidimensional RPI limits the scope of
social comparison to the overall performance measure and
therefore don’t provide the opportunity for self-affirmation
in other dimensions.
Another social-psychological phenomenon that appears
to be relevant in the analysis of motivational effects of RPI
on attention towards task dimensions refers to an individ-
ual’s desire for social distinction. Such an innate desire to
differentiate oneselve from others is argued to be a ‘hard-
wired trait of human nature’.45 Past research concerned with
the motivational effects of symbolic awards highlights social
distinction as a driver in award-seeking behaviour.46 In the
context of the provision of multidimensional RPI which com-
pares people based on different task dimensions, the desire
for social distinction can potentially cause motivational ef-
fects that are similar to those of a need for self-affirmation.
Specifically, it may foster a selective concentration on one or
more task dimensions which are seen to be possible sources
of distinction.
This reasoning is supported by Snyder and Fromkin
(1980) who formulate a theory of uniqueness seeking which
is related to the concept of social distinction as it states that
individuals strive for a moderate self-distinctiveness.47 They
constitute that similarities with others are perceived as being
unpleasant and can thus trigger a motivation to positively
reaffirm distinctiveness.48 However, this assumption con-
tradicts to some extent the prediction of social comparison
theory that discrepancies in abilities result in a ‘pressure to-
ward uniformity’.49 Thus, it is important to note that motiva-
tional effects based on the drive for social distinction as well
as uniqueness seeking are – in contrast to self-affirmation
theory – not induced by a negative social comparison expe-
rience. Rather, the social comparison facilitated by RPI pro-
vides a basis on which people can differentiate themselves
from others and it might therefore lead toward a motivation
to perform better than the comparison targets. As already
described, multidimensional RPI offers various opportunities
to satisfy distinction which can result in a strong focus on
individual task dimensions and thereby also in a disregard
of overall performance. Contrastingly, in the presence of
44Cf. Tesser et al. (2000), p. 1481.
45Frey (2007), p. 8.
46Cf. Bourdieu (1979); Ginsburgh (2003); Frey (2007).
47Cf. Snyder and Fromkin (1980).
48Cf. Lynn and Snyder (2002), p. 396; Simsek and Yalicetin (2010), p.
576; Cf. Snyder and Fromkin (1980).
49Festinger (1954), p. 126.
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unidimensional RPI, people can only positively distinguish
themselves based on their overall performance although they
act in a multidimensional task setting.
Task-oriented and rivalry-oriented competitiveness
The examination of the motivational impact of RPI in gen-
eral has already outlined how the presence of RPI enables
social comparison which can enforce competitive behaviour
described as ‘action to protect one’s superiority’.50 On this
basis, the consideration of socio-psychological research on
competition can provide further insights regarding the mo-
tivational influence of RPI on attention towards task dimen-
sions in multidimensional task settings.
Competition, defined in situational terms by Deutsch
(1949), describes a setting in which the goal attainment
of separate participants is negatively correlated, implying
that a participant can only achieve his goal if the related
others fail in achieving their goals.51 With regard to this
definition, RPI induces competition since it facilitates social
comparison which motivates individuals to achieve a supe-
rior position in a performance ranking as compared to their
counterparts. Based on the early research on competition52,
its psychological consequences and behavioural effects have
been extensively studied. An important distinction underly-
ing many of these analyses applies to the different forms of
competiveness that it evokes.53 According to Griffin-Pierson
(1990), competitiveness can be defined as an achievement
motive or component of achievement motivation.54 So far,
this study has not yet considered different types of competi-
tiveness underlying the competitive behaviour which results
from the provision of RPI. However, they might be a deter-
minant of attention towards task dimensions as part of an
individual’s competitive behaviour. Therefore, the two main
types of competitiveness which can arise from competition
are discussed briefly.
The first type of competitiveness is characterized by its fo-
cus on a performance goal and the related desire to success-
fully perform a task and ‘to be the best one can be’.55 Vari-
ous authors have described this competitiveness perspective
but have labelled it differently, mainly as ‘goal competitive-
ness’56, ‘personal development competitiveness’57 or as ‘task-
orientated competitiveness’.58 Fundamentally, this type of
competitiveness refers to a traditional understanding of com-
petition causing ‘behaviour oriented toward a goal in which
the other competitors for the goal are secondary’.59 This im-
plies that the social comparison processes induced by RPI mo-
tivate an individual primarily to increase task-related effort
50Festinger (1954), p. 126.
51Cf. Deutsch (1949).
52E.g. Triplett (1898); Deutsch (1949); Johnson and Johnson (1989);
May and Doob (1937).
53Cf. Tassi and Schneider (1997), p. 1560; Griffin-Pierson (1990), p. 108;
Ryckman et al. (1996), p. 375.
54Cf. Griffin-Pierson (1990), p. 108.
55Griffin-Pierson (1990), p. 108.
56Cf. Griffin-Pierson (1990); Morey and Gerber (1995).
57Cf. Ryckman et al. (1996).
58Cf. Tassi and Schneider (1997).
59Mead (1937), p. 8.
as well as effort directed toward learning in order to improve
itself.60 In the following, the study refers to this achievement
motive as task-oriented competitiveness.
On the contrary, studies on competition also emphasize
a second type of competitiveness that has its focus not on a
goal but on others and is thereby called ‘interpersonal com-
petitiveness’61, ‘hypercompetitiveness’62 or ‘other-referenced
competitiveness’63. Inherent to this type of competitiveness
is an individual’s desire to win and to avoid losing, accom-
panied with the enjoyment of interpersonal competition.64
Thus, competition that involves this achievement motive is
also framed as rivalry which is partly treated as a separate
concept in past literature.65 From the social comparison per-
spective, the presence of RPI can thus emphasize a motiva-
tion that is mainly about outperforming competitors as well
as achieving a higher rank and not in principle on master-
ing a task as good as possible.66 In this respect, an indi-
vidual’s needs for self-enhancement and for maintaining a
positive self-image dominate the motive of self-improvement.
The study labels this competiveness perspective as rivalry-
oriented competitiveness.
The characterization of the two forms of competitive-
ness suggest that they might cause different behavioural re-
sponses to RPI in situations that offer people the opportu-
nity to increase their position in a ranking by other means
than improving overall performance. Exemplary, prior re-
search argues that rivalry-oriented competitiveness can pro-
mote dysfunctional effects of competition like reduced re-
porting honesty as well as sabotage of comparison counter-
parts.67 In multidimensional task settings, it might result
in unintended behaviour with regard to people’s attention
towards the different task dimensions. In particular, mul-
tidimensional RPI enforces competition on several task di-
mensions which provides an individual with the chance to
outrank their competitors in at least one dimension with-
out necessarily achieving a better performance on the multi-
dimensional task overall. Therefore, to the extent that it
evokes rivalry-oriented instead of task-oriented competitive-
ness, multidimensional RPI might drive the motivation to fo-
cus on winning one of the competitive rankings disregarding
the consequences for performance in other dimensions. This
might imply a distortion of attention which can be in princi-
ple compared to the described behavioural consequences of
self-affirmation and social distinction. Comparably, there is
no distortion effect expected in case of the provision of uni-
dimensional RPI because it indicates that ranking improve-
ments can be only achieved through enhancements related
60Cf. Tassi and Schneider (1997), p. 1559; Ryckman et al. (1996), p. 375.
61Cf. Griffin-Pierson (1990); Morey and Gerber (1995).
62Cf. Ryckman et al. (1990); Ryckman et al. (1996).
63Cf. Tassi and Schneider (1997).
64Cf. Ryckman et al. (1990), p. 630; Griffin-Pierson (1990), pp. 108-109.
65Cf. Mead (1937), p. 8; Kilduff et al. (2010), pp. 945-946; Tassi and
Schneider (1997), p. 1558.
66Cf. Hibbard and Buhrmester (2010), p. 413; Kilduff et al. (2010), p.
961.
67Cf. Brown et al. (2014); Schreck (2014); Charness et al. (2013).
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toward the aggregated measure of task performance.
2.2. Learning effects of RPI
2.2.1. Learning effects of RPI in general
The preceding analysis on the motivational effects of RPI
is built on the finding that RPI represents an important type
of information which facilitate the self-evaluation of abilities
in the absence of an objective standard. Therefore, the provi-
sion of RPI serves an informational function which not only
has implications for an individual’s motivation but also af-
fects its learning on how to improve performance.
According to the feedback intervention theory proposed
by Kluger and Denisi (1996)68, RPI is expected to trigger
learning processes as it informs an individual about a dis-
crepancy between its own performance and a performance
standard.69 Particularly, such a feedback-standard compari-
son may stimulate the search for a task-specific plan or the de-
velopment of a new task-specific strategy in case an increase
in effort as a ‘universal strategy’ proves not to be success-
ful.70 The learning process involves the generation and re-
evaluation of working hypotheses about appropriate strate-
gies with which one’s performance can be improved. These
hypotheses, in turn, also function as standards in the evalu-
ation of the success of changed behaviour.71 In this respect,
past research on social comparison emphasizes the role of
upward comparison in providing information on how to ad-
vance and make progress regarding a particular task.72 No-
tably, upward comparative information can tell people ‘what
they would have to achieve to move up in the ability distri-
bution’73 and the superior counterparts might serve as role
models in the learning process.74
However, Kluger and Denisi (1996) also point out that
the effectiveness of a feedback intervention is determined
by the extent to which it directs information to enhanced
self-efficacy.75 Self-efficacy can be defined as an individual’s
belief in its own ability to influence specific situations that
affect its live.76 The various psychological consequences of
self-efficacy beliefs include effects on attentional and think-
ing processes. Bandura and Wood (1989) state that strong
self-efficacy directs people’s attention toward problem solv-
ing and the development of task strategies. On the other
hand, self-doubts of efficacy may strengthen concerns on per-
sonal deficiencies as well as the concentration on possible
68The feedback intervention theory by Kluger and Denisi (1996) integrates
several theories and re- search paradigms on the concept of feedback. Feed-
back interventions are defined as ‘actions taken by (an) external agent (s)
to provide information regarding some aspect(s) of one’s task performance’
(Kluger and Denisi (1996), p. 255).
69Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996), pp. 259-260.
70Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996), p. 263; cf. Wood and Locke (1990).
71Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996), p. 263.
72Cf. Corcoran et al. (2011), p. 124; Collins (1996), p. 52
73Collins (1996), p. 52.
74Cf. Lockwood et al. (2002), p. 854; Corcoran et al. (2011), p. 124; Suls
et al. (2002), p. 161.
75Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996), p. 276.
76Cf. Bandura (1977b) has established the self-efficacy theory in succes-
sion of the social learning theory (Bandura (1977a)).
adverse consequences of failures.77 Consequently, feedback
can not only affect an individual’s learning through the in-
formation it provides about how to develop further, but also
through its effect on the cognitive processes related toward
the effective use of this information.
The relationship between the presence of RPI and an indi-
vidual’s self-efficacy beliefs depend on whether the involved
social comparison implies assimilative or contrastive evalua-
tions.78 As described earlier, assimilation refers to an identi-
fication with the comparison target. Therefore it is suggested
to raise self-efficacy in upward comparisons as it demon-
strates the attainability of certain goals. On the contrary, a
comparison with other from a contrastive perspective rather
leads to frustration and resentment associated with lower
self-efficacy.79 Following this logic, assimilation and contrast
oppositely affect perceived self-efficacy in downward com-
parisons. Thereby, it can be concluded that both upward as-
similation as well as downward contrast in social compari-
son processes might increase the learning from RPI because
of their positive effect on self-efficacy beliefs.
2.2.2. Learning effects of RPI in multidimensional task settings
In multidimensional task settings, learning can be related
toward the improvement of dimension-specific performance
as well as the refinement of the allocation of attention to-
wards the different task dimensions. Focussing on the latter,
the following analysis aims to answer the question to what
extent RPI can help individuals to find an appropriate strat-
egy on how to divide attention based on their dimension-
specific abilities. For this purpose, the effects are differenti-
ated between unidimensional and multidimensional RPI con-
sistent with the analysis on the motivational effects of RPI.
The previous section has outlined that RPI can facilitate
learning as it allows a feedback-standard comparison which
is necessary for the generation and re-evaluation of working
hypotheses regarding performance enhancing task-specific
strategies.80 Applied to a multidimensional task setting, the
development of a strategy on the allocation of attention re-
quires the formation of hypotheses regarding its relation-
ship with dimension-specific performance and overall perfor-
mance. In the presence of unidimensional RPI, an individual
can only base these hypotheses on comparative information
regarding the overall performance measure. However, this
implies that an individual cannot disentangle the drivers of
the performance of superior and inferior others. Especially, it
does not have the opportunity to compare its strategy along
with its dimension-specific abilities to that of its competitors.
Therefore, an individual might generate a multitude of hy-
potheses since unidimensional RPI does not provide enough
information so that erroneous hypotheses can be rejected.81
77Cf. Bandura/Wood (1989), p. 806.
78Cf. Carmona et al. (2008); Suls et al. (2002).
79Cf. Bandura and Jourden (1991); Lockwood et al. (2002); Carmona
et al. (2008).
80Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996), p. 263.
81Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996), pp. 263-264; Hattie and Timperley
(2007), p. 93; Castellan and Swaine (1977).
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By contrast, multidimensional RPI informs an individual on
how its dimension-specific and its overall performance com-
pare with that of its counterparts. This provides the basis
for the evaluation of hypotheses on the relation between
dimension-specific performance, allocation of attention and
overall performance. From that, inferences can be drawn
with regard to the relative success of certain strategies. Con-
sequently, multidimensional RPI appear to be more helpful
than unidimensional RPI in supporting an individual’s learn-
ing on how to allocate attention between task dimensions in
order to improve performance.
Another concern of the preceding analysis on the learn-
ing effects of RPI in general has been the influence of RPI on
self-efficacy. In general, RPI that implies upward assimila-
tion or downward contrast can increase self-efficacy beliefs.82
However, it arises the question if unidimensional and multidi-
mensional RPI might differently affect self-efficacy and there-
with also the effective use of the provided information for the
development of task-specific strategies. Against this back-
ground, two determinants of self-efficacy can be identified
that may vary depending on the informational value of RPI.
Firstly, as already indicated before, self-efficacy can be en-
hanced by vicarious experience to the degree that it shows an
individual that others can overcome difficulties in performing
a task.83 Vicarious experience rely on social comparison and
has a higher impact on efficacy as it provides an individual
with information on the performance strategies of superior
ones.84 In this regard, multidimensional RPI potentially can
raise self-efficacy in a greater manner than unidimensional
RPI. The second relevant determinant of self-efficacy is task
complexity which is suggested to lower efficacy beliefs. An
important component of complexity is an individual’s uncer-
tainty on its abilities for performance in situations in which
the precise skills required are unclear.85 Here, multidimen-
sional RPI is expected to contribute to the reduction of com-
plexity by providing social comparison information that links
dimension-specific and overall performance and can there-
fore help to lower uncertainty on skill requirements. Over-
all, it appears that multidimensional RPI is more beneficial
for learning processes on task strategies than unidimensional
RPI not only because of the information it provides about
how to allocate attention appropriately, but also through its
predicted effects on self-efficacy.
2.3. Influence of financial incentives on motivational effects of
RPI
2.3.1. Influence of financial incentives in general
From a standard economic perspective, the provision of
RPI should not affect an individual’s motivation and per-
formance as long as compensation is not based on relative
82Cf. Bandura and Jourden (1991); Lockwood et al. (2002); Carmona
et al. (2008).
83Cf. Bandura (1977b), p. 197.
84Cf. Bandura (1977b), p. 197; Gist and Mitchell (1992), p. 194.
85Cf. Gist and Mitchell (1992), p. 194; Cervone et al. (1986), p. 492.
performance.86 Therefore, the study has relied on social-
psychological theories in analysing the motivational effects
of RPI. This section now serves to integrate findings of eco-
nomic theories in order to examine the influence of finan-
cial incentives on the predicted effects of RPI. Firstly, insights
from agency theory are provided so as to analyse how finan-
cial rewards influence motivation. Afterwards, it is specifi-
cally considered how individual performance-based compen-
sation might affect the motivational impact of RPI.
To begin with, conventional economic theories predict
that a performance-based compensation contract compared
to a flat wage contract motivates individuals to exert higher
effort and to achieve better performance.87 Agency theory, in
particular, derives this prediction from the fundamental as-
sumptions that individuals are fully rational and solely mo-
tivated by self-interest. On this basis, individuals are pre-
sumed to strive for a maximization of their expected utility
which is described by a utility function that represents pref-
erences for increases in wealth and leisure. Since performing
a certain task involves a reduction in leisure, individuals are
expected to not exert effort on that task as long as it does
not contribute to their economic well-being.88 Typically, a
flat wage contract does not satisfy this condition because it
implies that compensation is not linked to an individual’s per-
formance. In this context, the principal-agent branch of the
agency theory is concerned with the optimal design of com-
pensation contracts in case an individual (principal) engages
another individual (agent) to perform a task on its behalf
while it cannot fully observe the exerted effort. Notably, as
principal-agent models commonly assume that the agents are
strictly risk-averse, compensation contracts have to appropri-
ately balance the need for motivating effort against the need
for risk-sharing.89
Principal-agent theory refers to RPI in the context of
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) which implies that
an individual’s compensation is tied to its performance rel-
ative to that of its peers. Holmstrom (1982) argues that
RPE induces higher effort from risk-averse agents than indi-
vidual performance-based compensation in case the agents
face some common uncertainty. Since RPE allows to filter out
common uncertainty from an agent’s performance, it reduces
an agent’s exposure to ‘systematic risk’ without lowering its
incentives.90 Originating from this idea, past research dis-
cusses tournament compensation schemes as a specific type
of RPE. Comparably to RPI that is provided in the form of per-
formance rankings, tournament schemes link compensation
86Cf. Holmstrom (1982); Kandel and Lazear (1992).
87Cf. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) for an overview of relevant theories
and of research findings on variables that moderate the relationship be-
tween financial incentives and performance (e.g. person variables, task
variables, environmental variables etc.). It should be noted that con-
flicting social-psychological theories exist which predict negative effects of
performance-based compensation, e.g. Deci and Ryan (1985) argue in their
self-determination theory that financial incentives may crowd out intrinsic
motivation and therefore decrease effort and performance.
88Cf. Baiman (1982); Baiman (1990); Eisenhardt (1989).
89Cf. Baiman (1990), pp. 342-343.
90Cf. Holmstrom (1982), p. 334-337; Antle and Smith (1986), p. 2.
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to an individual’s ordinal rank in a tournament.91
As already mentioned, based on economic theories, RPI
itself should have no effect when compensation is linked
to individual performance instead of relative performance.92
Nevertheless, considering both economic and social-psycho-
logical theories, prior research suggests that the outlined pos-
itive incentive effect of individual performance-based com-
pensation and the predicted motivational impact of RPI have
an accumulative influence on an individual’s performance.93
However, it appears to be unclear if the motivational effects
of financial incentives and RPI are only additive or if there is
an interaction mechanism between them. Bonner and Sprin-
kle (2002) conclude from a review of past literature that in-
centive and feedback effects in general do not interact but are
typically ‘independent and additive so that there is no simple
two-way interaction’94. Yet, in a recent study, Tafkov (2013)
aims to develop theory that specifically explains how individ-
ual performance-based compensation moderates the effect of
RPI on performance.95 With regard to social comparison the-
ory, Tafkov (2013) hypothesizes that RPI is more useful for
social comparison purposes under individual performance-
based compensation compared to a flat wage contract. The
underlying reasoning is that performance-based compensa-
tion motivates higher effort levels which results in a clearer
relationship between task performance and ability. There-
fore, individuals are more likely to attribute performance dif-
ferences to differences in abilities which is expected to result
in greater social comparison involvement and in turn to in-
crease the motivational effect of RPI.96 Although the study
finds empirical support for this prediction, additional theo-
retical analyses seem to be required in order to substanti-
ate the socio-psychological underpinnings of such an interac-
tion mechanism. Hence, overall, there remains uncertainty
whether the motivational effects of financial incentives and
RPI are additive or they reinforce each other through an in-
teraction effect.
2.3.2. Influence of financial incentives in multidimensional
task settings
The analysis of the motivational impact of RPI in multi-
dimensional task environments has shown that RPI cannot
only affect effort but also peoples’ attention towards task di-
mensions. Comparably, economic theory considers the com-
plexities inherent in providing appropriate financial incen-
tives in multitask and multidimensional task environments.
Past literature commonly labels attention towards different
tasks or task dimensions as effort allocation. In particular,
agency-theoretic models are concerned with effort distortion
effects which arise when compensation contracts are incom-
plete because multiple tasks of a job, or multiple dimensions
91Cf. Lazear and Rosen (1981); Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
92Cf. Holmstrom (1982); Kandel and Lazear (1992).
93Cf. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002); Kluger and Denisi (1996); Chung and
Vickery (1976).
94Bonner and Sprinkle (2002), p. 329.
95Cf. Tafkov (2013).
96Cf. Tafkov (2013), pp. 330-331; cf. Festinger (1954).
of a task, vary in their measurability.97 In this context, re-
search also investigates how social pressure or social pref-
erences like fairness influence effort distortion effects in the
presence of incomplete compensation contracts.98 However,
since this study focus on settings in which all task dimensions
are measurable, this stream of literature is not examined in
further detail. Rather, it is of relevance how financial rewards
based on an individual’s overall performance influence the
expected motivational effects of RPI in multidimensional task
settings.
The previous section has shown that financial incentives
and RPI both increase an individual’s motivation to success-
fully perform a task which might result in an additive per-
formance effect or even a positive interaction. In a multi-
dimensional task setting, yet, the induced motivations might
conflict with each other to the extent that they are directed
towards different task dimensions. Particularly, financial in-
centives based on overall performance are expected to moti-
vate an appropriate allocation of attention between different
task dimensions.99 That is, individuals should be motivated
to allocate attention according to their hypothesis of how
to increase overall performance based on their dimension-
specific abilities. This complies with the motivational ef-
fects of unidimensional RPI but can conflict with a motiva-
tion to focus entirely on one task dimension which is po-
tentially caused by multidimensional RPI. The latter refers
to a potential distortion of attention toward a dimension in
which an individual can prove its competence induced by
self-affirmation tendencies, the desire for social distinction
or a rivalry-oriented competitive attitude. In this context,
individuals potentially face a trade-off in performance goals
when provided with multidimensional RPI while compensa-
tion is tied to overall performance. It is important to note that
individual performance-based compensation itself is not ex-
pected to affect self-affirmation, social distinction or rivalry
as long as the monetary rewards received by competitors are
not or at least not precisely known.100 Hence, an individual’s
behavioural response toward such a trade-off is likely to be
determined by the strength of the countervailing effects.
The motivational effects of incentive compensation are
suggested to be intensified by the magnitude of a certain pay-
off as well as the probability of achieving it.101 The strength
of the mentioned socio-psychological processes, however, is
fundamentally based on the underlying social comparison.
As noted earlier, the commensurability of a comparison tar-
get, the psychological closeness toward it and the relevance
of a performance dimension reinforce the psychological ef-
fects of social comparison.102 It is worth mentioning that
97E.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991); Datar et al. (2001); Feltham and
Xie (1994); Baker (2002).
98For example Fehr and Schmidt (2004); Brüggen and Moers (2007);
Schmidt (2011).
99Cf. Datar et al. (2001); Baiman (1990); Prendergast (1999).
100Cf. Frey (2007), p. 8.; cf. Sherman and Cohen (2006); Kilduff et al.
(2010).
101Cf. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002); Baiman (1982); Baiman (1990).
102Cf. Tesser (1988); Garcia et al. (2006); Goethals and Darley (1977).
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rivalry-oriented competitiveness, which may be triggered by
these factors, can motivate an individual to apply a task strat-
egy that improve its position in a ranking at the cost of its
economic wealth.103 Past research associates such economi-
cally irrational behaviour with a psychological state of ‘com-
petitive arousal’ which results from rivalry.104 It implies that
an individual’s desire to outperform its competitors in a spe-
cific dimension of a multidimensional task can dominate its
motivation to increase its wealth through a concentration on
overall performance. Yet, in sum, no general conclusion can
be drawn with regard to the behavioural outcomes result-
ing from the potentially conflicting motivations induced by
financial incentives and RPI.
2.4. Empirical findings of related studies
Various experimental studies have generated empirical
findings on the performance impact of RPI resulting from
its behavioural effects. Based on the preceding theoretical
analysis, this section reviews existing evidence on the effect
of RPI on performance in general and presents empirical in-
sights on its interaction with financial incentives. Afterwards,
it outlines the findings of the few studies concerned with the
effects of RPI in multitask environments since evidence from
multidimensional task settings do not exist yet.
At first, studies are considered which explore perfor-
mance effects of RPI based on field data. Here, recent work
of Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) is of relevance as it ap-
plies a data set from a firm-level quasi experiment in order to
study the effect of feedback on relative performance under
a piece rate pay scheme.105 In particular, the researchers
review personnel records of a German wholesale and retail
organization which started to privately communicate to the
workers of its main warehouse how they rank in the pro-
ductivity/wage per hour distribution. The findings suggest a
long-lasting 6.8 percent increase in workers’ productivity fol-
lowing the start of the provision of the ranking information.
Additionally, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) emphasize
that this effect can be clearly attributed to the motivational
effects of social comparison since the institutional settings
implies that the ranking did not have any compensation or
career consequences. In another context, research by Az-
mat and Iriberri (2010) also proves positive performance
effects of RPI even though individuals are rewarded accord-
ing to their absolute performance.106 The study exploits data
from a natural experiment that took place in a Spanish high
school in which students received for only one year private
information on their performance relative to the average
performance in their class. The analysis shows a 5.0 percent
increase in the student’s grades in reaction to the provision
of this information. Notably, the positive effect was signif-
icant for the whole distribution and disappeared once the
information was removed.
103Cf. Malhotra (2010); Ku et al. (2005); Garcia et al. (2006).
104Cf. Malhotra (2010), p.140; Ku et al. (2005), pp. 92-93.
105Cf. Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011).
106Cf. Azmat and Iriberri (2010).
Additional insights on the effects of RPI, however, can be
drawn from the results of a field experiment analysed by Tran
and Zeckhauser (2012).107 The researchers also investigate
the impact of RPI on academic performance but distinguish
the effects between private and public disclosure of ranking
information. Specifically, in the course of the field experi-
ment conducted at a University in Vietnam, students enrolled
in a one-semester English course were divided into three
groups and either received private, public or no information
on how their performance ranked relative to their peers after
biweekly progress tests. Although the performance rankings
brought no direct tangible benefits, the analysis reveals that
the provision of RPI resulted in a higher performance of the
treatment groups compared to the control group in a final
test at the end of the course. Interestingly, the findings im-
ply that the performance increases compared to the control
group were around 45 percent higher for those students who
received their rank publicly instead of privately.
Further evidence on the performance impact of various
types of RPI are provided by laboratory experiments which
also offer insights on the moderating effects of different com-
pensation schemes. To begin with, Tafkov (2013) proves in a
laboratory environment that both private and public RPI pos-
itively influence performance but that the effects are magni-
fied when RPI is public.108 Those findings are based on a real-
effort experiment in which participants had to solve multiple-
choice multiplication problems for nine independent rounds
without any outside aid. At the end of rounds three, six, and
nine, participants in the RPI-condition were informed about
the rank of their performance within a group of five partic-
ipants. In this setting, Tafkov (2013) not only manipulate
the type of RPI between subjects but also test the effects of
RPI under a flat-wage as well as an individual-performance-
based contract. As already noted in section 2.3.1, the results
support the hypothesis that the positive performance effects
of RPI are stronger under performance-based compensation
as it contributes to a clearer relationship between task per-
formance and ability.
In contrast to the insights of Tafkov (2013), an exper-
iment conducted by Murthy (2011) does not reveal signif-
icant interaction effects between RPI and different com-
pensation schemes.109 However, the study compares the
effects of RPI under a piece-rate scheme and under two
target-based schemes but does not consider a flat wage
contract. The target-based schemes consisted of a budget-
based scheme and quota-based scheme which both represent
performance-contingent compensation contracts. Similar
to Tafkov (2013), participants of the experiment of Murthy
(2011) had to solve a real-effort task which, yet, involved
three periods of decoding numbers into letters. After every
round, they were publicly informed about their position in
a ranking of all 20 participants of the session. Overall, the
results reveal a significant performance effect of RPI which is
107Cf. Tran and Zeckhauser (2012).
108Cf. Tafkov (2013).
109Cf. Murthy (2011).
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remarkably highest for participants in the bottom third of the
performance distribution. Although no interaction effects are
found between the provision of RPI and the different com-
pensation schemes, the application of a quota-based contract
led to significant performance enhancements which indicate
an additive effect with RPI.
The review of empirical findings regarding the interac-
tion between RPI and different compensation contracts can
be expanded by considering two experimental studies which
compare the performance impact of RPI under an individual
incentive scheme and under a tournament scheme. First, a
study of Hannan et al. (2008) examines the interaction ef-
fects between RPI and the two compensation contracts while
varying the precision of RPI.110 In particular, participants in
the RPI-condition of the experiment were either provided
with ‘coarse’ or with ‘fine’ feedback referring to whether RPI
showed the half or the percentile of a performance distribu-
tion in which someone ranked relative to others. The task
that was applied in the experiment required participants to
act as managers and to make output decisions for a single
product over 12 trials. The amount of profit points which
they earned through their decisions were influenced by a ran-
domly determined state of nature which induced a common
error in the setting. Participants had to develop a strategy in
order to effectively perform the task and they could evalu-
ate its relative success through the RPI which was privately
provided after every fourth trial. Overall, the experimental
results show a disordinal interaction between RPI and the
compensation scheme since RPI improved mean performance
under an individual scheme regardless of its precision but
negatively affected it under a tournament scheme if it was
precise. The analysis indicates that this mean performance
deterioration was not caused by reduced effort but rather by
the adoption of ineffective strategies of those who performed
below the 80th percentile in the first half of the tournament.
In addition to the insights of Hannan et al. (2008), a sec-
ond study published by Eriksson et al. (2009) renders evi-
dence on how the frequency of RPI impacts performance un-
der the different incentive schemes.111 In the experiment,
participants were matched in pairs and had to add sets of
two-digit numbers individually while they were either con-
tinuously informed about the score of their competitor or re-
ceived that information halfway during the working period.
Surprisingly, the results here do not comply with previous
findings since they suggest that RPI does not improve perfor-
mance, regardless of its frequency and the pay scheme. In-
stead, it is shown that the continuous provision of RPI causes
subjects in both pay schemes to make more mistakes com-
pared to when they receive no RPI. Notably, the study does
not find an interaction effect between RPI and the compensa-
tion scheme. However, supplementary experimental sessions
reveal that the lack of positive effects of RPI in the individual
pay scheme may be due to subjects already exerting maxi-
mum effort in the absence of RPI which is why there is little
110Cf. Hannan et al. (2008).
111Cf. Eriksson et al. (2009).
room for improvements.
The presented empirical studies generate informative in-
sights on the effects of RPI and mainly demonstrate that the
provision of RPI leads to significant improvements in perfor-
mance. This gives support to the expected positive influence
of RPI on an individual’s motivation and learning. However,
the findings solely relate to unidimensional task settings with
one relevant performance dimension. A first attempt to ex-
amine the generalizability of the positive performance impact
of RPI to settings with multiple performance dimensions is
made by Hannan et al. (2013).112
In particular, this study aims to capture an organizational
setting in which employees have to fulfil multiple tasks with
diminishing marginal returns whereby the firm has specific
preferences over the allocation of effort across those tasks.
Therefore, participants in the experiment had to work on
both a math task and a verbal task while their compensa-
tion was not based on performance but on an equal effort
allocation. RPI were provided after each of four rounds ei-
ther in public or in private. Importantly, it informed partici-
pants on how they ranked in each of the two tasks among a
group of five contestants. With regard to the preceding the-
oretical analyses, this form of RPI might induce a distortion
effect in a multitask environment based on an individual’s
tendency to seek self-affirmation, its desire for social distinc-
tion or a rivalry-oriented competitive attitude. Accordingly,
the study shows that the presence of RPI increased motiva-
tion but also induced an effort distortion effect as participants
concentrated on one task while reducing their performance
on the other task. Both behavioural effects were magnified
under public RPI. In this context, however, the induced ef-
fort distortion was only detrimental to performance when RPI
were public but did not negatively affect it under private RPI.
In a recent working paper of Hannan et al. (2014)113,
the experimental instrument used in Hannan et al. (2013) is
adapted in order to examine how the effort distortion effects
of public RPI depend on RPI time horizon and RPI detail.
For this purpose, the study varied time horizon by provid-
ing participants with RPI that is either based on the current
period performance or that refers to the cumulative perfor-
mance across all periods. Additionally, RPI detail was ma-
nipulated in the form that participants either received only
ordinal ranking information (less detailed) or actual perfor-
mance values (more detailed) on all contestants on each task.
The experimental results indicate that the effort distortion of
RPI is exacerbated when RPI is more detailed or when it is
cumulative. Also, an interaction effect between RPI detail
and time horizon is identified since effort distorting effects of
more detailed RPI are greatest when RPI is cumulative. From
a theoretical perspective, the authors emphasize that these
observed effects might be driven by underlying social com-
parison processes and the desire for social distinction. While
cumulative RPI can be more useful for social comparison pur-
poses as it offers a more stable and meaningful measure of
112Cf. Hannan et al. (2013).
113Cf. Hannan et al. (2014)
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ability, more detailed RPI should enable participants to dif-
ferentiate themselves to a greater degree from their peers.
Therefore, participants might have a greater motivation to
distort their effort away from an equal allocation and to con-
centrate on one task in which they can proof their compe-
tence.
3. Hypotheses and research questions on effects of RPI
on performance and attention towards task dimen-
sions
The objective of this study is to explore how the presence
and the dimensionality of RPI affect performance and atten-
tion towards task dimensions in multidimensional task set-
tings. In particular, the study aims to compare the effects of
unidimensional RPI with that of multidimensional RPI under
different compensation schemes. To address this research in-
terest, two directed hypotheses and four two-tailed research
questions are developed building on the preceding analysis
of the behavioural effects of RPI.
First, the performance effects of unidimensional RPI are
considered in order to establish the basis for a comparison
with multidimensional RPI. From a social-psychological per-
spective, unidimensional RPI facilitates social comparison by
which an individual can assess its overall ability to perform
a multidimensional task in the absence of an objective stan-
dard. In this context, social comparison is expected to drive
an individual’s motivation to enhance its performance on the
overall task and to reduce performance discrepancies to su-
perior others. These motivational effects should manifest in
competitive behaviour involving higher effort and also the
alignment of attention towards task dimensions to the over-
all performance measure.114 Therefore, unidimensional RPI
is expected to positively affect performance in multidimen-
sional task settings. Consistent with this prediction, exper-
imental studies reviewed in chapter 2.4 provide empirical
support for performance improvements induced by RPI.115
Even though these studies relate to unidimensional task set-
tings, they strengthen the outlined expectation since there
is no theoretical indication that motivational effects of uni-
dimensional RPI differ in multidimensional task setting. In
addition, unidimensional RPI can increase learning on task-
specific strategies because of its informational value as well
as its potential positive effect on self-efficacy.116 However,
section 2.2.2 emphasizes that learning effects might be lim-
ited because of the multidimensionality of the task setting.
Overall, the following hypothesis formally summarizes the
outlined expectations:
H1: Overall performance is greater when individ-
uals receive unidimensional RPI compared to when
they receive no RPI.
114Cf. Festinger (1954); Suls et al. (2002); Buunk and Mussweiler (2001).
115E.g. Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011); Azmat and Iriberri (2010); Tran
and Zeckhauser (2012); Tafkov (2013).
116Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996); Bandura (1977b); Bandura and Jourden
(1991); Corcoran et al. (2011).
Next, the performance implications of providing unidimen-
sional RPI under different compensation schemes are consid-
ered. As illustrated in chapter 2.3.1, economic theories, such
as agency theory in particular, predict that performance-
based compensation motivates higher performance than
a flat wage which is not tied to performance.117 In this
regard, the study aims to examine the performance ef-
fects of RPI in multidimensional task settings under an
individual performance-based scheme rewarding overall
performance and under a flat wage contract. According
to prior research, the motivational effects of financial in-
centives and that of RPI generally have an accumulative
impact on performance.118 Thus, given that unidimensional
RPI facilitates social comparison regarding the performance
measure that is relevant for compensation, performance is
expected to increase when unidimensional RPI is provided
together with performance-based instead of flat wage com-
pensation. However, as outlined in section 2.3.1, it appears
to be unclear whether this will be driven by an addition or a
positive interaction between the motivational effects of RPI
and individual performance-based compensation. Therefore,
the expectations are restricted to the performance difference
between the provision of unidimensional RPI under an indi-
vidual performance-based scheme and a flat wage which is
formally captured in the following hypothesis:
H2: Overall performance is greater when individ-
uals receive unidimensional RPI and are compen-
sated based on an individual performance-based
contract compared to when they are compensated
based on a flat wage contract.
In the following, it is considered how multidimensional RPI
compared to unidimensional RPI might differently affect
overall performance because of its potentially deviating in-
fluence on attention towards task dimensions. Here, it seems
to be preferable to develop two-tailed research questions in-
stead of directed hypotheses. Firstly, the theoretical analysis
of the behavioural effects of multidimensional RPI in chapter
2 implies conflicting influences on attention allocation which
have not been studied in this context before. Secondly, the
resulting overall performance cannot be clearly predicted as
it is determined by the interplay between attention allocation
and individual abilities.
Multidimensional RPI might have a different influence
on attention allocation since it does not limit the scope of
social comparison to the overall performance measure but
also facilitates peer comparisons on dimension-specific per-
formance. As shown in section 2.1.2, this can induce a selec-
tive concentration on a task dimension in which an individ-
ual has the chance to outperform its peers and can therefore
achieve self-affirmation, social distinction or satisfy its desire
to win a contest.119
117Cf. Baiman (1982); Baiman (1990); Eisenhardt (1989).
118Cf. Tafkov (2013); Bonner and Sprinkle (2002); Kluger and Denisi
(1996); Chung and Vickery (1976).
119Cf. Steele (1988); Sherman and Cohen (2006); Frey (2007); Kilduff
et al. (2010).
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Two experimental studies, Hannan et al. (2013) and Han-
nan et al. (2014), find empirical support for the described be-
havioural effect of RPI in a multitask environment in which
individuals are provided with task-specific rankings but do
not receive RPI on overall performance.120 Importantly, mul-
tidimensional RPI also compares overall performance and
therefore it may only cause differences in attention alloca-
tion to the degree that it promotes a strong concentration
on one of the individual task dimensions that does not re-
flect overall performance. However, in contrast to this mo-
tivational effect which potentially induces a distortion of at-
tention, multidimensional RPI also implies a learning effect
that may promote an appropriate allocation of attention ac-
cording to individual abilities. Particularly, section 2.2.2 has
outlined that multidimensional RPI can be more beneficial
for learning processes on task strategies than unidimensional
RPI through its informational value and its expected greater
effect on self-efficacy.121 Therefore, both an individual’s mo-
tivation and learning under multidimensional RPI can cause
differences in attention allocation compared to unidimen-
sional RPI but from a theoretical perspective. However, from
a theoretical perspective, it appears to be unclear how these
effects ultimately manifest in behaviour. Also, so far no em-
pirical studies provide insights on that question since Hannan
et al. (2013) and Hannan et al. (2014) exclude the influence
of overall rank information from their experimental setting
and do not consider learning effects. Consequently, the fol-
lowing research question is stated:
RQ1a: Will attention towards task dimensions
differ when individuals receive multidimensional
RPI compared to when they receive unidimensional
RPI?
Elaborating on this research question, the influence of finan-
cial incentives on attention allocation differences between
unidimensional and multidimensional RPI is taken into con-
sideration. Section 2.3.2 has illustrated that a compensa-
tion contract based on overall performance implies motiva-
tional effects which might conflict with the described social-
psychological incentives for a distortion of attention under
multidimensional RPI. Therefore, people can face a trade-
off in attention allocation to the degree that the motivations
induced by the compensation contract and by multidimen-
sional RPI are directed towards different task dimensions.
The behavioural outcome of this trade-off is expected to be
determined by the strength of these potentially countervail-
ing effects which can be influenced by various individual and
situational factors.122 In this context, it can be noticed that
the introduction of financial incentives can weaken attention
distortion effects caused by multidimensional RPI. However,
by directing attention towards overall performance, this may
120Cf. Hannan et al. (2013); Hannan et al. (2014).
121Cf. Kluger and Denisi (1996); Hattie and Timperley (2007); Bandura
(1977b); Cervone et al. (1986).
122Cf. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002); Baiman (1990); Tesser (1988); Garcia
et al. (2006).
in turn increase the impact of learning benefits associated
with the provision of multidimensional RPI. Thus, overall it
cannot be predicted to which extent attention allocation dif-
ferences between unidimensional and multidimensional RPI
may be present when compensation is tied to individual over-
all performance.
This is captured in the research question below:
RQ1b: When individuals are compensated based
on an individual performance-based contract, will
attention towards task dimensions differ when they
receive multidimensional RPI compared to when
they receive unidimensional RPI?
Based on the consideration of differences in attention to-
wards task dimensions under multidimensional RPI com-
pared to unidimensional RPI, implications for overall per-
formance are taken into account. Importantly, there is no
indication that the two forms of RPI vary in their effect on
the overall level of effort expended on a task which is why
the development of research questions on potential perfor-
mance differences relates to differences in attention alloca-
tion. Since individuals are expected to differ in their abilities
to perform various dimensions of a multidimensional task,
overall performance can significantly depend on an appro-
priate allocation of attention. As it was emphasized before,
multidimensional RPI may foster a strong concentration on
a task dimension that is different from overall performance
but is perceived to offer the highest chance for an individual
to prove its competence and to outperform its peers. Thus,
an individual is motivated to focus attention on its relative
strengths within a multidimensional task which can involve
positive and negative effects on overall performance. More
concretely, the performance effects are determined by the
marginal return of effort implied by the allocation of atten-
tion. A shift of attention toward one specific task dimension
positively affects performance as long as it increases the
marginal return of overall effort spend on a task compared
to an alternative allocation of attention. Yet, the extent to
which the marginal return can be increased by focussing
on one dimension is naturally limited in multidimensional
task settings. Depending on an individual’s abilities, overall
performance will be negatively affected when the attention
devoted toward a specific dimension reaches a certain pro-
portion at which marginal return decreases. However, it
cannot be predicted to which extent individuals shift their
attention based on the motivational effects of RPI. Besides,
learning effects may be also a source of differences in perfor-
mance resulting from the provision of the two forms of RPI. It
was constituted before that multidimensional RPI promotes
the development of a task-strategy that aligns attention to-
wards task dimensions with an individual’s abilities. There-
fore, individuals are expected to be better able to maximize
their marginal return to effort under multidimensional com-
pared to unidimensional RPI. This in turn can imply possible
performance improvements. In sum, the two forms of RPI
should lead to different performance to the extent that their
motivational and learning effects manifest in differences in
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the fit between attention towards task dimensions and in-
dividual abilities. On this basis, two research questions are
stated which reflect the prior differentiation between pos-
sible attention allocation differences in general and in the
presence of an individual performance-based compensation
contract:
RQ2a: Will overall performance differ when indi-
viduals receive multidimensional RPI compared to
when they receive unidimensional RPI?
RQ2b: When individuals are compensated based
on an individual performance-based contract, will
overall performance differ when they receive mul-
tidimensional RPI compared to when they receive
unidimensional RPI?
4. Methodological approach
4.1. Laboratory experiments as a research method to study be-
havioural effects of RPI
In the present study, the derived hypotheses and research
questions are tested within a controlled laboratory exper-
iment. Therefore, this section briefly outlines methodical
characteristics of experimental research with regard to the
examination of the behavioural effects of RPI in laboratory
settings.
Experimental studies in general are characterized by
an active and purposeful manipulation of an independent
variable in order to measure its influence on a dependent
variable. By using the principle of randomization, exper-
iments allow to control for the influence of confounding
variables and hence provide the opportunity to draw causal
inferences regarding the relationship between the observed
variables.123 However, compared to field experiments that
take place in natural environments, laboratory experiments
create artificial situations in which researchers can investi-
gate cause-effect relations ‘under pure and uncontaminated
conditions’124. In the laboratory, the action and decision
environment of experimental participants is subject to tight
control and variables can be precisely and objectively mea-
sured. Accordingly, the generated results are expected to
be replicable and have a higher degree of internal validity.
Yet, the abstraction and simplification involved in laboratory
experiments is also accompanied by a reduction of external
validity in comparison to field experiments. Therefore, the
possibilities to generalise results from the laboratory context
to real-word settings are limited.125
Based on the advantage of laboratory experiments in en-
suring internal validity and establishing causal inferences,
they are especially useful for testing, comparing and refining
theoretical predictions and assumptions.126 Therefore, vari-
ous empirical studies employ laboratory experiments in order
123Cf. Sprinkle (2003), p. 289; Schnell et al. (2008); p. 212.
124Sprinkle (2003), p. 289; cf. Kerlinger and Lee (2000).
125Cf. Loewenstein (1999), p. 26; Schnell et al. (2008), p. 219.
126Cf. Smith (1994); Simon (1987).
to examine the behavioural effects of RPI.127 The flexibility
inherent in the laboratory approach allows the researchers to
vary the provision of RPI in different settings, to test bound-
ary conditions and to isolate the influence of economic and
social-psychological factors.128 In this way, it is possible to
identify precise interrelations of involved variables and to
gradually expand the insights on the behavioural regulari-
ties implied by RPI. Accordingly, based on previous findings,
the current study conducts a laboratory experiment in order
to distinctively test its hypotheses and research questions in a
controlled setting and thus to provide a first understanding of
the behavioural validity of theoretical predictions concerning
the presence of RPI in multidimensional task environments.
As indicated before, experimental results generated in
the laboratory have various desirable characteristics but re-
searchers also face concerns regarding their external validity.
Commonly, it is argued that the findings are exposed to a
subject pool bias since the experimental subjects are often
students. Such objections are particularly relevant for ex-
periments that examine individual behaviour in tasks which
require professional experience like for example asset trad-
ing or product pricing. Also, student samples seem to be
problematic if experiments aim to describe population pa-
rameters like risk preferences or if they are interested in the
influence of socio-economic factors on certain preferences or
behaviour.129 In contrast, however, the presented experimen-
tal studies on RPI as well as the current study test theoretical
predictions that relate to fundamental behavioural patterns
which are independent of assumptions regarding the partic-
ipant pool. Therefore, it is important to note that student
samples indeed lack representativeness but that this is gen-
erally not expected to be a major threat to the validity of the
experimental findings on the behavioural effects of RPI.130
Another concern on the external validity of laboratory
experiments relates to the question if they capture essen-
tial conditions that prevail in reality. Experiments cannot
integrate all conditions of a real-word environment, since
abstraction and simplification are necessary in order to en-
sure internal validity. Essentially, it depends on the pur-
pose of the experiment to which extent the manipulations
should be applied in a realistic context. Laboratory studies
on RPI typically add realism by conducting ‘real effort’ ex-
periments where subjects do not choose hypothetical effort
levels based on a monetary function but actually work on a
specific task.131 In this context, however, researchers have
to accept some loss of control since they cannot observe the
participants’ cost of effort. In addition, some studies examin-
ing the impact of public RPI in comparison to private RPI re-
quired experimental subjects to introduce themselves to the
others at the beginning of the session.132 Therewith the re-
127Cf. Chapter 2.4.
128Cf. Sprinkle (2003), p. 289.
129Cf. Feltovich (2011), p. 372; Falk and Fehr (2003), p. 401.
130Cf. Falk et al. (2009), p. 55; Falk and Heckman (2009), p. 537.
131Cf. Falk and Fehr (2003), p. 404; v. Dijk et al. (2001).
132Cf. Tafkov (2013); Hannan et al. (2013).
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searchers removed the anonymity in the laboratory and mod-
elled the setting closer to a workplace context in which col-
leagues know each other. Nevertheless, experiments cannot
implement mundane realism and should only include addi-
tional context variables when they are expected to directly
enhance the validity of the results since it may also reduce
the superior control possibilities in the laboratory.133
In sum, it is important to note that results drawn from
laboratory experiments can be usefully complemented with
findings from field experiments or quasi-experiments.
Building on clean evidence generated in the laboratory,
field data can provide representative insights since they cap-
ture individual’s behaviour in real situations and typically in-
clude larger samples.134 Therefore, research progress regard-
ing the behavioural effects of RPI is driven by both laboratory
and field studies.
4.2. Specification of the experimental design
4.2.1. Real effort task
In accordance with previous laboratory experiments ex-
amining the behavioural effects of RPI, this study employs
a ‘real effort’ experiment in order to test its hypotheses and
research questions. The current chapter hence starts with a
description of the applied ‘real effort’-task which is then used
a basis to explain the experimental manipulations.
Participants of the experiment are required to perform a
multidimensional task on an individual computer terminal
for six consecutive rounds of 360 seconds each.135 The task
consists of solving multiplication problems with different dif-
ficulty levels. In particular, participants are provided with
task blocs that include six multiplication problems which are
ordered according to increasing difficulty. All problems of a
bloc are shown on one screen but participants can only solve
them in the given order. Therefore, participants have to start
each task bloc with the problem of the lowest difficulty level
and can only proceed to the next level when they solve it
correctly. After entering a solution to a problem, participants
have to click on the corresponding ‘OK’-button so that the
program can check whether the answer is correct or not. A
warning message appears in case participants enter wrong
answers and then they have the opportunity to retry solv-
ing the problem. Importantly, participants do not have to
deal with all difficulty levels included in a bloc but can also
change to the next task bloc after solving the first problem
of the lowest difficulty level. However, participants receive
points for solving the multiplication problems and the higher
the difficulty level, the more points can be earned on a prob-
lem. Therefore, the points per task bloc rise progressively
with the difficulty level. Exemplary, a task bloc with two cor-
rectly solved problems accounts for 3 points while a bloc with
four problems accounts for 16 points. Once participants click
133Cf. Libby et al. (2002), p. 797.
134Cf. Falk et al. (2009), pp. 5-6; Falk and Ichino (2006); Azmat and
Iriberri (2010).
135The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software, cf. Fischbacher
(2007).
on the corresponding button to change to the next bloc, they
are prohibited from returning to the previous one. Per round,
a maximum of 75 task blocs can be displayed which is yet
far beyond the number of blocs that participants can solve
in 360 seconds even if they only work on problems with the
lowest difficulty level. The task blocs are presented in the
same order to all participants and have to be solved without
any outside aid which also includes writing materials.
The total number of points earned by participants reflects
their overall task performance and is determined by their per-
formance in two task dimensions – the number of task blocs
solved as well as the average number of points earned per
bloc. Participants can individually decide at which difficulty
level they change from one task bloc to another and there-
fore they have the opportunity to adopt various task strate-
gies. Notably, there is no dominant strategy since partici-
pants’ overall performance depend on the extent to which
they align their attention towards the two task dimensions
with their abilities in solving multiplication problems. For
example, a certain participant may make the best out of his
abilities by solving many task blocs with a rather low num-
ber of points per bloc. In contrast to such a ‘quantity’-strategy,
another participant can be able to maximize his overall per-
formance by following a ‘value’-strategy which implies that
he solves fewer task blocs but concentrates on achieving a
higher number of points per bloc.
Following a math task applied by Hannan et al. (2013),
the differentiation between the difficulty levels of the multi-
plication problems is based on two criteria: (1) number of
digits in the two multiplicands (e.g. multiplying a one-digit
and a two-digit number compared to multiplying two, two-
digit numbers) and (2) frequency of carry-overs required to
solve the problem.136 Various pre-tests have been conducted
to specify the two criteria in a manner that the time required
for solving a problem increases considerably with the diffi-
culty level. Additionally, the increase in points that can be
earned per difficulty level is balanced so that the marginal
return of solving an additional problem differs considerably
with the participants’ abilities. Specifically, the time that it
takes a participant to solve a problem determines the diffi-
culty level until which there is an increase in points earned
per second of time that is spend on a task bloc. Overall, this
ensures that the task design is appropriate for testing the un-
derlying theory.
4.2.2. Experimental manipulations
The conducted experiment is characterized by a 3 x 2
between-subjects design that implies the manipulation of two
factors which represent the primary independent variables
of interest. The first factor constitutes the provision of RPI
and is varied a three levels: No RPI, Unidimensional RPI and
Multidimensional RPI. The second factor is the compensa-
tion contract which is manipulated at two levels: Flat wage
136Cf. Hannan et al. (2013), p. 559-560. See Online-Appendix 1 for an
overview on the specification of the difficulty levels, including the number
of points that participants could earn per difficulty level.
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contract and individual performance-based contract. There-
fore, the experiment involves six treatments which are ap-
plied between-subjects so that each of the participants is ex-
posed to one of the treatments.
The use of a between-subject design has the advantage
over a within-subjects design that carryover-effects between
treatments are avoided which can otherwise
threaten the internal validity of the results. Additionally,
a between-subject design reduces ‘demand effect’ concerns
which relate to the risk that participants form assumptions
over an experiment’s purpose and change their behaviour
accordingly. Therefore, previous experiments examining the
behavioural effects of RPI systematically rely on between-
subjects design. However, it should be also noted that within-
subjects designs in comparison have the upside that fewer
participants are required to generate statistical powerful re-
sults since it is controlled for subject-specific noise.137
In all treatments, participants receive individual perfor-
mance information at the end of each round showing them
their overall score as well as the number of task blocs solved
and the average number of points earned per task bloc. The
latter only takes into account task blocs that are completed,
meaning that participants have clicked on the corresponding
button to change to the next bloc. Therewith, it is ensured
that the performance measure is not distorted by unfinished
task blocs at the end of the rounds. The individual perfor-
mance information is provided with regard to the current
period performance and the cumulative performance across
all periods. During all rounds, participants can keep track of
their current period performance which is displayed on the
top of the task screen.
In the ‘No RPI’ treatment, no additional performance in-
formation is presented to the participants. In the treatments
that involve the provision of RPI, participants are assigned
to groups of five and receive public ranking information that
compare their cumulative performance to that of the other
group members at the end of each round. For that purpose,
participants have to choose one out of eight given fictional
nicknames at the beginning of the experiment which they
keep over all rounds.138
Since anonymity has to be preserved in order to comply
with the guidelines of the laboratory in which the experi-
ment is conducted, participants do not know how the chosen
names match to the actual persons in the laboratory. In gen-
eral, the presented RPI only informs participants about per-
formance ranks but they do not learn about the specific per-
formance levels of the other group members. In this way, RPI
cannot be used for wage comparison purposes in the treat-
ment that applies an individual performance-based contract.
Participants in the ‘Unidimensional RPI’ treatment receive
only one ranking comparing the cumulated number of points
137Cf. Libby et al. (2002), p. 804; Schnell et al. (2008), p. 210; Field and
Hole (2002), p. 75.
138The given nicknames include gender-neutral common surnames which
did not allow for conclusions on personal characteristics. The members of a
group are required to choose different names.
of the group members after every round. In the ‘Multidimen-
sional RPI’ treatment, two additional rankings are provided
that involve performance comparisons related to the number
of task blocs solved and the average number of points earned
per task bloc. In both treatments, participants with the high-
est rank after a certain round see a picture of a golden trophy
on their computer screen next to the corresponding ranking.
At the end of the experiment, congratulations to the final win-
ners of the rankings are displayed publicly in addition to the
privately shown trophies. Through the combination of RPI
with such symbolic rewards, the setting is modelled closer
to a ‘gamification’ context in which employees receive virtual
batches that demonstrate their relative success in a certain
task or task dimension.139
As indicated before, the manipulations related to the pro-
vision of RPI are crossed by the variation of the compensa-
tion contract at two levels. In the ‘Flat wage’ treatment, par-
ticipants earn a fixed amount of 1 Euro for each of the six
rounds independent of their performance on the task. In
contrast, the compensation in the ‘Individual performance-
based’ treatment is determined by the total number of points
that participants have achieved at the end of the experiment.
Specifically, they receive 0.2 Euro for each point which im-
plies that they can earn a maximum of 1.10 Euro for a com-
pletely solved task bloc which accounts for 55 points.
4.3. Experimental procedures and participants
The experiment was conducted in the experimental labo-
ratory MELESSA140 at the University of Munich. It involved
six separate experimental sessions with each representing
one of the described treatments.
The sessions were divided into two independent parts –
the first part was designed to elicit the participants’ risk pref-
erences and the second part represented the actual real effort
experiment. Upon arrival, participants were told that they
would go through two independent experiments and then
received instructions on the first part which were read aloud
by the experimenter.141 Participants were not informed what
the second part would involve. The measurement of the par-
ticipants’ risk preferences in advance to the real effort ex-
periment is necessary in order to control for the influence
of risk preferences on attention towards task dimensions. In
particular, the risk involved in solving multiplication prob-
lems increases with the difficulty level of the problems since
participants get more uncertain about whether they will be
able to solve the problem correctly and about how long it
will take. Therefore, risk aversion might be a determinant
of attention allocation when compensation is tied to indi-
vidual performance.142 The experimental design that is ap-
plied to elicit participants’ risk preferences is similar to one
139Cf. Deterding et al. (2011); Reeves and Read (2013).
140MELESSA abbreviates ‘Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic
and Social Sciences’.
141See Online-Appendix 2 for the instructions on the first part of the exper-
iment.
142Agency theory emphasizes that risk-averse individuals dislike the in-
come risk that is associated with performance-based compensation (cf.
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developed by Holt and Laury (2002) and consists of simple
lottery choices.143 Participants were required to make ten
choices between paired lotteries and were informed that one
choice will become relevant for payment by which the incen-
tive compatibility of each decision is ensured. The informa-
tion on the relevant choice as well as the associated payment
were revealed at the end of the experimental session.
Upon completion of the first part, the instructions for
the actual real effort experiment were handed out and read
aloud.144 Participants had the chance to ask questions and
were then required to take a pre-experiment quiz. So as to
ensure that participants understand the experiment, they
could not proceed until they scored 100 percent on the
quiz.145 After all participants passed the quiz, they were
given the opportunity to practice the task in a training round
in which no manipulations were applied. The instructions
emphasized that participants should use the training round
in order to develop a task strategy that fits their abilities.
Following to the training round, participants could again
ask questions in case anything remained unclear to them.
Next, participants in the treatment conditions that involved
the provision of RPI had to choose a fictional name which
they kept for the rest of the experiment. Then, participants
performed the real effort task for six consecutive rounds.
Afterwards, they were asked to complete a post-experiment
questionnaire that included questions concerning controls
and demographic data.146 Finally, participants privately
received their payment from the experiment in cash. On av-
erage, participants earned 12.7 Euro for approximately one
hour of participation, including the payment from the lottery
of averagely 2.5 Euro as well as the show-up fee of 4 Euro.
Notably, the average earnings did not differ significantly be-
tween the two compensation treatments (t=0.54, p=0.58,
two-tailed).
The experiment was conducted with 150 participants so
that each session employed 25 participants. All participants
were students that had been recruited from the participant
pool of the experimental laboratory MELESSA through an
anonymous invitation procedure using ORSEE software147.
Of the participants, 86 were male (57.3 percent) and 64 were
female (42.7 percent). Overall, participants were similar on
related attributes like age, education and mathematical back-
ground. The mean age was 22.9 (s.d.=3.66) and the par-
ticipants were primarily undergraduate students (74.7 per-
cent)148. Furthermore, most of them majored in a math-
related field of study (80.6% percent)149. With regard to
Baiman (1990), Prendergast (1999)). In the applied set- ting, participants
can reduce their income risk by concentrating on multiplication problems
with low difficulty level.
143Cf. Holt and Laury (2002).
144See Online-Appendix 3 for the instructions on the real effort experiment.
145See Online-Appendix 4 for the questions of the pre-experiment quiz.
146See Online-Appendix 5 for the questions of the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire.
147Cf. Greiner (2004).
148The rest of the participants either had already completed a bachelor’s
degree (16.0 percent) or a master’s degree/diploma (9.3 percent).
149The math-related fields of study include Business & Economics (55.3
their risk preferences, the results of the first experiment indi-
cate that the participants were overall risk averse. On aver-
age, their ten lottery choices involved 5.99 (s.d.=1.64) save
choices.150
Additionally, the participants’ preference for competi-
tion is measured in the post-experimental questionnaire by
a question adapted from Griffin-Pierson (1990).151 Using
a seven-point Likert scale, participants had to assess the
degree to which they perform better when they are compet-
ing against someone rather than when they are the only
one striving for a goal (1=not at all, 7=to a great de-
gree). The participants’ average assessment equaled 4.09
(s.d.=1.99). Furthermore, the questionnaire included con-
trol questions which required participants to indicate on the
same scale the degree to which they were interested in the
task (mean=4.23, s.d.=2.06) and to which they knew the
task from prior experiments (mean=1.29, s.d.=0.95).
Across the treatments, there was no significant varia-
tion in the presented personal variables except for some
differences in gender, age, mathematical background and
risk aversion.152 Therefore, the multivariate analysis of the
experimental results controls for the influence of these indi-
vidual characteristics on performance as well as on attention
towards task dimensions.
5. Results
5.1. Tests of hypotheses and research questions
5.1.1. Bivariate analyses
The two primary dependent variables of the analysis of
the experimental results are performance and attention to-
wards task dimensions. The performance of the participants
is measured by the total number of points that they earned
through solving multiplication problems over six rounds. The
measure of attention towards task dimensions is defined by
the participants’ average difficulty level per task bloc which
underlies their overall performance.153 This variable reflects
the participants’ allocation of attention between the ‘value’
dimension and the ‘quantity’ dimension of the task since it
indicates at which difficulty level participants have changed
from one task bloc to another.154
Table 1 and Table 2 report summary statistics for perfor-
mance as well as attention towards task dimensions and pro-
vide bivariate comparisons between treatments. In Panel A
percent), Natural Science & Engineering (17.3 percent) as well as Formal
Sciences (8.0 percent).
150Cf. Holt and Laury (2002), p. 1649, 5 save choices indicate ‘slight risk
aversion’, 6 save choices indi- cate ‘risk aversion’.
151Cf. Griffin-Pierson (1990).
1521) Gender: 40% male participants under Multidimensional RPI/Flat
Wage, 64% under Unidimen- sional/Flat Wage, No RPI/Flat Wage, No
RPI/Perf.-based (t=1.71, p=0.09, two-tailed). 2) Age: Mean age of 21.76
under No RPI/Perf.-based, 23.88 under Multidimensional RPI/Perf.-based
(t=1.98, p=0.06, two-tailed). 3) Math Background: 68% of participants
major in math-related field of study under Unidimen- sional RPI/Flat Wage,
92% under No RPI/Perf.-based (t=2.18, p=0.04, two-tailed). 4) Risk Pref-
erences: Mean number of save choices is 5.68 under No RPI/Flat Wage, 6.64
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Figure 1: Effect of RPI and Financial Incentives on Mean Performance
Figure 2: Effect of RPI and Financial Incentives on Mean Difficulty Level
of each of the Tables, treatment data are pooled for the three
levels of RPI. Panel B presents a comprehensive overview on
all six treatments including the effects of the variation of the
compensation contract. Figure 1 and Figure 2 each show a
graphical summary of the mean values presented in Panel B
of Table 1 and Table 2. Since both dependent variables do
not follow a normal distribution155, non-parametric tests are
under Unidimensional RPI/Flat Wage (t=2.10, p=0.04, two-tailed).
153In the following, ‘average difficulty level’, ‘difficulty level’ and ‘attention
towards task dimensions’ is used synonymously.
154The average difficulty level is calculated based on the averages per
round. The last task bloc of a certain round is excluded from the calcu-
lation of the average difficulty level per round in order to avoid distortion
because of unfinished task blocs. When only one task bloc was solved in a
period (relates to 22 out of 900 observations), the difficulty level of this bloc
is included.
155Normality tests on performance / attention towards task dimensions:
used to statistically compare treatments. First, p-values are
reported for a two-tailed Mann-Whitney pairwise test which
examines whether two independent samples are drawn from
populations with the same distribution.156 In order to al-
low for a more comprehensive analysis, the results of a Pear-
son Chi-Squared test on the equality of medians157 are pro-
vided in addition because the data samples on the dependent
variables both include various (extreme) outlying observa-
tions158. Overall, each participant is treated as an indepen-
dent observation which also applies to further statistical tests
1) Shapiro-Wilk-Test: z=7.14 / 5.29, p=0.00 / 0.00; 2) Skewness/Kurtosis
tests: adj. χ2(2)=73.47 / 23.76, p=0.00 / 0.00, Skewness=2.48 / 1.16,
Kurtosis=12.55 / 4.13.
156Cf. Mann and Whitney (1947); Acock (2006), p. 144.
157Cf. Brown and Mood (1951); Acock (2006), p. 145; Vorberg and
Blankenberger (1999), pp. 158-160
158Outliers are defined as observations which are at least 1.5 interquartile
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that are used in the course of the analysis.159
In hypothesis H1, it is predicted that participants perform
better under the provision of unidimensional RPI compared
to when they do not receive RPI. The data in Panel A of Table
1 support this prediction since they show that performance
is significantly higher under unidimensional RPI (p=0.06
/ 0.05)160. Notably, the standard deviation of the perfor-
mance of participants provided with unidimensional RPI is
also considerably higher which reflects a greater spread of
the data.161 Panel B of Table 1 shows that this spread is
especially driven by the treatment involving performance-
based compensation since the related standard deviation of
performance clearly exceeds the one that can be observed
under a flat wage contract. Furthermore, in accordance with
the prediction of hypothesis H2, mean values indicate a per-
formance increase when participants receive performance-
based instead of flat wage compensation in addition to uni-
dimensional RPI. As illustrated in Figure 1, this performance
effect seems to be additive since the induced performance
difference between the two compensation contracts is simi-
lar when participants are not presented with RPI. However,
in contrast to the performance effect suggested by the mean
values, the related medians imply a slightly negative effect
of performance-based compensation. This difference be-
tween mean and median values can be explained by the
strongly right-skewed distribution of performance under a
performance-based contract162 which includes two extreme
outliers163. Consequently, the p-values obtained from the
comparison between performance-based and flat wage com-
pensation under unidimensional RPI reveal that there is no
significant performance difference (p=0.82 / 0.40). There-
fore, in sum, the results do not support the prediction of
hypothesis H2.
The research questions RQ2a and RQ2b address the per-
formance effect of multidimensional RPI compared to that of
unidimensional RPI. First, with regard to RQ2a, Panel A of Ta-
ble 1 suggests that participants perform worse when they re-
ceive multidimensional instead of unidimensional RPI. Nev-
ranges (IQRs) below the first quartile or above the third quartile of the dis-
tribution, cf. Hoaglin et al. (1986). Extreme outliers are at least 3.0 IQRs
below the first quartile or above the third quartile. See Online-Appendix 6
and Online-Appendix 7 for boxplots on the dependent variables performance
and difficulty level by treat- ment which illustrate the (extreme) outlying ob-
servations.
159This corresponds to an approach used by prior experimental studies (e.g.
Hannan et al. (2008), Bracha and Fershtman (2013)). However, it is con-
troversial whether individual-level observations within a ranking group are
independent from each other.
160Order of p-values: Mann-Whitney test / Pearson Chi-Squared test.
161Levene’s test indicate that there is overall no significant variance hetero-
geneity between treat- ments: F=0.86, p=0.51 (cf. Levene (1960), results
are robust under nonnormality).
162Skewness/Kurtosis tests on performance under unidimensional RPI and
performance-based contract / flat wage contract: adj. χ2(2)=22.57 / 3.86,
p=0.00 / 0.15, Skewness=2.50 / 0.63. See Online-Appendix 8 and Online-
Appendix 9 for histograms on the dependent variables performance and dif-
ficulty level by treatment.
163The extreme outlying observations relate to 2 participants with total
points of 827 (IQR: 3.28) and 1312 (IQR: 6.79).
ertheless, the reported p-values narrowly fail to confirm a sig-
nificant performance difference between the two forms of RPI
(p=0.19 / 0.11). Yet, participants provided with multidimen-
sional RPI also do not perform significantly better than those
in the ‘No RPI‘ treatments although this is suggested by mean
and median values (p=0.79 / 0.69)164. This contrasts the sig-
nificant performance effect of unidimensional RPI which was
presented before. Further insights on the influence of multi-
dimensional RPI on performance can be drawn from Panel B
of Table 1. Importantly, summary statistics indicate that the
performance decrease under multidimensional compared to
unidimensional RPI is more pronounced when participants
are compensated with a performance-based contract. This
interaction between the dimensionality of RPI and the ap-
plied financial incentives is graphed in Figure 1. In his con-
text and with regard to RQ2b, the Pearson Chi-Squared test
suggests that median performance is significantly different
when multidimensional RPI instead of unidimensional RPI is
used in conjunction with performance-based compensation
(p=0.11 / 0.09).165 Additionally, it should be noted that the
standard deviation of performance is also remarkably higher
under a performance-based contract compared to a flat wage
contract which is similar to the characteristics of the data on
performance under unidimensional RPI.
The examined research questions which are concerned
with the effects of the dimensionality of RPI on performance
are derived from the research questions RQ1a and RQ1b that
deal with possibly varying influences of unidimensional and
multidimensional RPI on attention towards task dimensions.
Considering RQ1a, the data in Panel A of Table 2 reveal that
the mean difficulty level at which participants changed from
one bloc to another is lower under multidimensional com-
pared to unidimensional RPI. However, it is also shown that
the median difficulty level is slightly higher under multidi-
mensional RPI. Overall, there is no significant difference in
attention towards task dimensions between the two forms of
RPI (p=0.72 / 1.00). Also, a comparison between the treat-
ments that involve the provision of multidimensional RPI and
the ‘No RPI’ treatments does not imply any significant varia-
tion (p=0.69 / 0.69)166.
The puzzling results derived from the pooled data are
driven by differences in the impact of the two forms of RPI
on attention towards task dimensions under performance-
based and flat wage compensation. As reported in Panel B
of Table 2, the application of a performance-based contract
is associated with an increase in mean and median difficulty
level when participants receive unidimensional RPI or no RPI.
The Mann-Whitney test indicates that this difference in atten-
tion allocation between the compensation contracts is signifi-
cant for unidimensional RPI (p=0.10 / 0.16).167 With regard
164P-values are not included in Table 1.
165The Mann-Whitney test do not indicate significance because of an up-
ward outlier under multidimensional RPI and performance-based compen-
sation. The related participant reached a total number of points of 1217
(IQR: 6.38).
166P-values are not included in Table 2.
167The Pearson Chi-Squared test does not indicate significance since the dif-
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to multidimensional RPI, the mean difficulty levels suggest
a slight increase when performance-based compensation is
applied but the median values show a reduction. The indi-
cation of a positive effect is caused by an extreme upward
outlier168 under performance-based pay and differences in
the skewness of the distributions.169 A comparison between
the effects of the two forms of RPI under different financial
incentives reveal that multidimensional compared to unidi-
mensional RPI induces a higher difficulty level under a flat
wage compensation but a lower difficulty level in the pres-
ence of a performance-based contract. Figure 2 graphically
summarizes the described interaction between the dimen-
sionality of RPI and the used compensation contract. How-
ever, concerning RQ1b, no significant difference can be found
in attention towards task dimension when participants re-
ceive multidimensional compared to unidimensional RPI un-
der performance-based compensation (p=0.36 / 0.16). Like-
wise, there is no significant difference when a flat wage con-
tract is applied (p=0.81 / 0.40).
So far, it can be summarized that unidimensional RPI
significantly increases participant’s performance in the ex-
amined multidimensional task setting even though this ef-
fect is not magnified under performance-based compensation
which contradicts the formulated prediction. Importantly,
the results of the bivariate analysis indicate that multidimen-
sional RPI has no significant positive effect on performance
but that it rather induces a performance decrease compared
to unidimensional RPI in the presence of a performance-
based contract. The negative performance effect is accompa-
nied by a lower difficulty level at which participants changed
from one task bloc another. However, this difference in at-
tention towards task dimensions between the two forms of
RPI under performance-based compensation appears not to
be significant. Overall, it can be also noted that both the pro-
vision of unidimensional and multidimensional RPI results in
a considerably higher spread of performance as compared to
when participants receive no RPI.
5.1.2. Multivariate analyses
Based on the results of the bivariate analyses, this section
aims to provide a more differentiated understanding of the
effects of the dimensionality of RPI in the presence of finan-
cial incentives. For this purpose, multiple linear regressions
are conducted which control for further determinants of the
dependent variables and consider interaction effects. In par-
ticular, three models are specified which are tested with an
OLS regression as well as a quantile regression approach. The
latter is defined for the 50th percentile and involves median
ference is strongly driven by two observations which relate to a participants
with an average difficulty level of 5.7 and 6.0.
168The related participant reached an average difficulty level of 6 (IQR:
6.81).
169Skewness/Kurtosis tests on attention towards task dimensions under
multidimensional RPI and performance-based contract / flat wage contract:
adj. χ2(2)=7.42 / 13.48, p=0.03 / 0.00, Skew- ness=1.66 / 1.08. See
Online-Appendix 8 and Online-Appendix 9 for histograms on the dependent
variables performance and difficulty level by treatment.
regressions. Notably, it is included in the analysis because of
its non-parametric character and its robustness to outlying
observations.170
In Table 3, results are reported for the dependent vari-
able performance. The findings of the median regres-
sion analysis are only shown for model (3) since its re-
sults for model (1) and model (2) do not considerably
differ from the presented OLS estimations.171 In order
to ensure the robustness of the OLS regression results,
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimators are
implemented.172 In this context, it should be also noted that
post-estimation analyses indicate no threat of multicollinear-
ity to the results.173
Model (1) consists of dummy variables indicating the pro-
vision of unidimensional RPI, multidimensional RPI as well
as performance-based compensation. The results imply that
performance is significantly higher under unidimensional
RPI (p=0.077) while the positive performance difference
between multidimensional RPI and no RPI is not statistically
significant (p=0.408). Also, the influence of performance-
based compensation appears to be positive but the coefficient
is insignificant (p=0.663). However, overall, the explana-
tory power of model (1) is low and the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected that all of the model coefficients are zero
(Prob>F=0.354, R2=0.021).
In model (2), personal variables are added so as to control
for differences in participants’ characteristics between treat-
ments. Specifically, the participants’ age and risk aversion are
included as well dummy variables that divide for gender and
indicate whether participants major in a math-related field
of study. Additionally, model (2) controls for participants’
preferences for competition because prior literature suggest
them to be determinant of performance in competitive task
settings.174 Importantly, the results reveal that the effects
of the dimensionality of RPI and of the applied compensa-
tion contract remain largely unchanged when personal vari-
ables are considered. Yet, it is also shown that participants’
age as well as their preference for competition both signif-
icantly positively affect performance (p=0.011, p=0.044).
Furthermore, model (2) in general is statistical significant
and has thus a higher explanatory power than model (1)
(Prob>F=0.010, R2=0.111).
Model (3) introduces interaction terms which account
170Cf. Koenker and Bassett (1978); Koenker (2005).
171A comprehensive overview of the results of the median regressions for
model (1) - (3) can be found in Online-Appendix 10.
172Breusch-Pagan test (cf. Breusch and Pagan (1979)) and White’s test
(cf. White (1980)) are applied in order to check for the homoscedastic-
ity of residuals. The Breusch-Pagan test (normality assump- tion removed)
indicates heteroskedasticity for model (2) and model (3) (χ2(1)=5.51,
p=0.019; χ2(1)=8.87, p=0.003).
173Estimated variance inflation factors (VIF) are constantly below the value
10 and thus indicate that there is no problematic degree of multicollinearity
(cf. Marquaridt (1970)). VIF ranges are as follows: model (1): 1.00-1.33;
model (2): 1.02-1.43; model (3): VIF=1.11-3.39.
174E.g. prior studies are concerned with gender differences in preferences
for competition that impact performance outcomes, cf. Croson and Gneezy
(2009); Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
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Table 3: Dependent Variable Difficulty Level – Regression Results
Model (1) reports treatment group effects only. Model (2) additionally includes the control variables Gender (dummy variable, 1=’male’, 2=’female’), Age
(mean-centered), Math-related Field of Study (dummy variable, 1=’Math-related Field of Study’, 2=’No Math-related Field of Study), Risk Aversion (range
0 - 10 where 0 indicates ’highly risk loving’ and 10 indicates ’highly risk averse’), Preference for Competition (participants’ responses on a seven-point Likert
scale to the statement ’I perform better when I compete against someone rather than when I am the only one striving for a goal’, 1=’not at all’, 7=’to a great
degree’). Model (3) adds interaction terms between the treatment groups for RPI and for compensation scheme as well as interaction terms between the
treatment groups for RPI and a dummy variable for participants’ position in the final ranking on overall performance (1=’Rank 4 or 5’, 2=’Rank 1, 2 or 3’).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimators are implemented in the OLS regression.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% level.
Regressors (DV: Performance) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg.
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Unidimensional RPI 62 71.173 159.7 149.72
(34.782) (39.136) (45.774) (27.287)
0.077* 0.071* 0.001*** 0.000***
Multidimensional RPI 26.86 14.199 128.8 99.212
(32.358) (32.143) (41.38) (26.656)
0.4078 0.6594 0.002*** 0.000***
Perf.-based Compensation 12.8 20.139 43.008 74.395
(29.27) (27.806) (35.829) (24.833)
0.6625 0.4701 0.2321 0.003***
Gender 2.7174 10.682 -6.598
(27.933) (23.853) (15.269)
0.9226 0.655 0.6664
Age 10.473 9.3839 6.3
(4.0629) (3.8275) (2.0672)
0.011** 0.015** 0.003***
Math-related Field of Study 63.401 24.004 45.385
(40.659) (34.228) (19.366)
0.1212 0.4843 0.021**
Risk aversion -14.34 -15.73 -10.25
(10.517) (8.587) (4.3635)
0.1748 0.069* 0.020**
Preference for Competition 15.696 5.6771 2.1902
(7.7417) (7.0996) (3.7655)
0.044** 0.4253 0.5618
Unidimensional RPI x Perf.-based Compensation -12.95 -69.86
(56.512) (35.073)
0.819 0.048**
(Continued)
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Table 3—continued
Regressors (DV: Performance) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg.
Multidimensional RPI x Perf.-based Compensation -67.1 -91.62
(56.761) (35.112)
0.2392 0.010***
Unidimensional RPI x Low Rank -208.5 -132.3
(46.048) (25.535)
0.000*** 0.000***
Multidimensional RPI x Low Rank -197.2 -169
(41.653) (26.248)
0.000*** 0.000***
Constant 279.34 245.85 310.64 253.21
(23.245) (78.173) (72.296) (34.588)
0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000***
N 150 150 150 150
Prob>F 0.3538 0.0098 0 -
R2 0.0214 0.1108 0.3025 -
Pseudo R2 - - - 0.2145
for differences in the performance effects of the dimension-
ality of RPI under performance-based and flat wage com-
pensation. Also, it contains interaction variables that dis-
tinguish between the influences of the two forms of RPI on
high ranked and low ranked participants.175 In this way, the
model addresses findings from the bivariate analyses which
indicate that performance effects of RPI differ with regard to
the applied compensation contract as well as that the stan-
dard deviation of performance is comparably higher in the
presence of RPI.
Overall, the inclusion of the interaction terms substan-
tially increases the predictive power of the model (Prob>F
=0.000, R2=0.303). The results are reported for an OLS
as well as a median regression. Importantly, both statis-
tical analyses indicate that performance significantly rises
under unidimensional RPI (p=0.001 / 0.000)176 as well as
under multidimensional RPI (p=0.002 / 0.000). The me-
dian regression finds moreover a significant positive effect of
performance-based compensation (p=0.003) while the re-
lated OLS estimates are still insignificant (p=0.232). By con-
trast, however, the interactions between performance-based
compensation and unidimensional as well as multidimen-
sional RPI are both negative (p=0.819 / 0.048; p=0.239
175High ranked participants are characterized by a final rank of 1, 2 or 3 on
overall performance. Low ranked participants are characterized by a final
rank of 4 or 5 on overall performance.
176Order of p-values: OLS regression / Median regression.
/ 0.010)177. The results are again significant for the me-
dian regression but not for the OLS regression which may
be explained by the already mentioned extreme upward out-
liers that are present in the treatments that involve RPI and
performance-based compensation. Notably, the size of the
coefficient of the interaction term is larger for multidimen-
sional RPI than for unidimensional RPI. In this context, the
significant negative interaction between multidimensional
RPI and performance-based pay in the median regression
has almost the same size as the positive performance effect
indicated by the dummy variable for multidimensional RPI.
Therefore, the overall effect of the application of multidimen-
sional RPI under performance-based compensation is nearly
zero. As opposed to that, OLS and median regression results
both imply that unidimensional RPI overall impacts per-
formance considerably positively when performance-based
compensation is applied.
Further on, model (3) shows significant negative inter-
actions between the two forms of RPI and the overall rank-
ing position of the participants (p=0.000 / 0.000; p=0.000 /
0.000). Specifically, in the case of multidimensional RPI, the
size of the coefficients of the OLS as well as the median re-
gression indicate that the performance of low ranked partici-
pants overall decreases as compared to when they receive no
RPI. For unidimensional RPI, the same can be concluded with
177The p-values that refer to the effect of unidimensional RPI are mentioned
first.
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regard to the estimates of the OLS regression. Also, the neg-
ative interaction effect appears to be greater for unidimen-
sional than for multidimensional RPI considering the OLS re-
sults. Yet, the opposite holds for the findings of the median
regression. Additional analyses disclose that these discrep-
ancies between the statistical analyses are caused by a down-
ward outlier178 included in the observations on performance
under unidimensional RPI which relates to a low ranked par-
ticipant. Lastly, with respect to the influence of personal vari-
ables on performance, model (3) confirms the positive in-
fluence of participants’ age (p=0.015 / 0.003) but also pre-
dicts a significant negative effect of risk aversion (p=0.069
/ 0.020). Furthermore, the positive impact of participants’
preference for competition is no longer significant (p=0.425
/ 0.562) while the median regression indicates that majoring
in a math-related field of study significantly increases perfor-
mance (p=0.484 / 0.021).
Overall, post-estimation analyses applied to the pre-
sented models reveal that the performance effects of uni-
dimensional and multidimensional RPI under flat wage com-
pensation do not significantly differ from each other.179 Sim-
ilarly, in model (3), no significant differences are found
between the interaction effects of the two forms of RPI with
the applied compensation scheme180 and the overall ranking
position of the participants181.
Table 4 reports regression results for the dependent vari-
able attention towards task dimensions. The presented mod-
els correspond to the models applied in the regression analy-
sis of the dependent variable performance. The estimates of
the median regression are not included in Table 4 since they
do not involve additional insights.182 Like in the prior anal-
ysis on performance, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
error estimators are used with regard to the robustness of
the OLS regression results.183 Also, applied post-estimation
analyses show no threat of multicollinearity.184
To begin with model (1), unidimensional RPI seem to in-
crease the difficulty level at which participants change from
one bloc to another while the effect of multidimensional
RPI appears to be negative as compared to the treatments
that do not involve RPI. However, neither of the two forms
of RPI significantly influence attention towards task dimen-
sions (p=0.603, p=0.921). By contrast, the results show
178The related participant only reached a total number of points of 23 (IQR:
- 1.80).
179Wald tests are applied in order to test for the equality of the coefficients
(cf. Wald (1943)). Model (1): F=0.77, p=0.381; Model (2): F=1.77,
p=0.186; Model (3): F=0.40, p=0.526.
180Wald test: F=0.72, p=0.398.
181Wald test: F=0.04, p=0.846.
182A comprehensive overview of the results of the median regressions for
model (1) - (3) can be found in Online-Appendix 11.
183Breusch-Pagan test (cf. Breusch and Pagan (1979)) and White’s test (cf.
White (1980)) are conducted to check for the homoscedasticity of resid-
uals. The Breusch-Pagan test (normality assumption removed) indicates
heteroskedasticity for model (2) and model (3) (χ2(1)=6.09, p=0.014;
χ2(1)=6.39, p=0.012).
184Estimated VIFs are constantly below the value 10 (cf. Marquaridt
(1970)). VIF ranges are as follows: model (1): 1.00-1.33; model (2): 1.02-
1.43; model (3): VIF=1.11-3.39.
that the application of performance-based compensation is
associated with a significant increase in the average difficulty
level (p=0.023). Yet, the explanatory power of model (1) is
relatively low and the model coefficients are overall not sig-
nificantly different from zero (Prob>F=0.146, R2=0.038).
In model (2), the addition of personal variables reveals
that participants’ risk aversion significantly lowers the diffi-
culty level at which they change from one task bloc to another
(p=0.001). On the other hand, it also indicates a signifi-
cant positive effect of participants’ preference for competition
and of majoring in a math-related field of study (p=0.045,
p=0.040). Apart from that, the effects of the two forms of RPI
and of the compensation scheme do not considerably change
as compared to model (1). In general, model (2) has a higher
explanatory power than model (1) and is statistically signifi-
cant (Prob>F=0.001, R2=0.174).
Next, model (3) includes interaction terms between the
dimensionality of RPI and the compensation scheme as well
as the total rank of participants. Therewith, the predictive
power of the model is increased (Prob>F=0.001, R2=0.209).
The results imply positive but insignificant coefficients for
the effects of unidimensional and multidimensional RPI on
the average difficulty level (p=0.113, p=0.329). Similar to
model (1) and (2), the OLS estimates demonstrate a signifi-
cant increase of the difficulty level under performance-based
compensation (p=0.048). There seems to be no interaction
between performance-based compensation and the provision
of unidimensional RPI since the related coefficient is nearly
zero (p=0.985). As opposed to that, the analysis reveals
that multidimensional RPI overall decreases the average dif-
ficulty level under performance-based compensation in com-
parison to when participants receive no RPI. Although the
coefficient is not significant, its size suggest that the interac-
tion effect outweighs the positive influence indicated by the
dummy variable for multidimensional RPI (p=0.246).
Model (3) additionally discloses that the interaction ef-
fects between the two forms of RPI and the overall ranking
position of the participants are both negative. Yet, the nega-
tive interaction is only significant in case of unidimensional
RPI (p=0.040, p=0.448). Notably, the coefficients show that
the application of unidimensional RPI overall lowers the av-
erage difficulty level of low ranked participants as compared
to the treatments which do not involve RPI. By contrast, the
overall effect of multidimensional RPI on the average diffi-
culty level remains to be positive with regard to low ranked
participants. Finally, in model (3), the risk aversion of partic-
ipants still significantly reduces the average difficulty level at
which they change from one bloc to another (p=0.001). Be-
sides, no other personal variable has a considerable influence
on attention towards task dimensions.
Post-estimation analyses are applied in order to test
whether the effects of unidimensional and multidimensional
RPI significantly differ from each other in the presented
models. Overall, no significant variation is found between
the influences of the two forms of RPI on attention towards
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Table 4: Dependent Variable Difficulty Level – Regression Results
Model (1) reports treatment group effects only. Model (2) additionally includes the control variables Gender (dummy variable, 1=’male’, 2=’female’), Age
(mean-centered), Math-related Field of Study (dummy variable, 1=’Math-related Field of Study’, 2=’No Math-related Field of Study), Risk Aversion (range
0 - 10 where 0 indicates ’highly risk loving’ and 10 indicates ’highly risk averse’), Preference for Competition (participants’ responses on a seven-point Likert
scale to the statement ’I perform better when I compete against someone rather than when I am the only one striving for a goal’, 1=’not at all’, 7=’to a great
degree’). Model (3) adds interaction terms between the treatment groups for RPI and for compensation scheme as well as interaction terms between the
treatment groups for RPI and a dummy variable for participants’ position in the final ranking on overall performance (1=’Rank 4 or 5’, 2=’Rank 1, 2 or 3’).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimators are implemented.
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% level.
Regressors (DV: Performance) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg.
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Unidimensional RPI 0.1087 0.2514 0.4612
(0.2083) (0.2052) (0.2891)
0.6027 0.2224 0.113
Multidimensional RPI -0.02 -0.017 0.3228
(0.2009) (0.2027) (0.3298)
0.9214 0.9325 0.3294
Perf.-based Compensation 0.394 0.4078 0.5566
(0.1713) (0.1654) (0.2795)
0.023** 0.015** 0.048**
Gender 0.2393 0.2847
(0.1689) (0.1736)
0.1588 0.1034
Age 0.0349 0.0337
(0.025) (0.0246)
0.1659 0.1727
Math-related Field of Study 0.3977 0.3096
(0.1915) (0.2118)
0.040** 0.1461
Risk aversion -0.176 -0.174
(0.051) (0.049)
0.001*** 0.001***
Preference for Competition 0.0805 0.0648
(0.0399) (0.0409)
0.045** 0.1151
Unidimensional RPI x Perf.-based Compensation 0.0075
(0.397)
0.9849
(Continued)
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Table 4—continued
Regressors (DV: Performance) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg. OLS Reg.
Multidimensional RPI x Perf.-based Compensation -0.47
(0.4033)
0.2461
Unidimensional RPI x Low Rank -0.553
(0.2669)
0.040**
Multidimensional RPI x Low Rank -0.251
(0.3295)
0.4477
Constant 2.5726 2.7851 2.8106
(0.1499) (0.4243) (0.4456)
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
N 150 150 150
Prob>F 0.1464 0.0006 0.0005
R2 0.0377 0.1737 0.2093
task dimensions under flat wage compensation.185 Also, with
regard to model (3), the interactions of unidimensional and
multidimensional RPI with the compensation scheme186 as
well as with the overall ranking position of the participants187
do not show significant differences.
5.1.3. Discussion
The effects of unidimensional RPI on performance and attention
towards task dimensions (H1, H2)
The basis for the examination of the influence of the di-
mensionality of RPI on performance and attention towards
task dimensions is laid by the first hypothesis H1 stating that
unidimensional RPI increases performance in multidimen-
sional task settings. The results of both the bivariate and
the multivariate analyses fully support the formulated pre-
diction. This substantiates the expected positive effects of
RPI on an individual’s motivation and learning which im-
ply higher effort and the alignment of attention allocation
towards overall task performance. Therefore, the findings
of prior research on performance improvements under RPI
appear to be generalizable to multidimensional task settings
when RPI compares peer performance based on an overall
performance measure that aggregates relevant task dimen-
sions.
However, regarding the second hypothesis H2, the anal-
ysis does not confirm the expected performance increase
185Cf. Wald (1943); Wald test: Model (1): F=0.34, p=0.560; Model (2):
F=1.70, p=0.194; Model (3): F=0.15, p=0.695.
186Wald test: F=1.36, p=0.245.
187Wald test: F=0.52, p=0.473.
when unidimensional RPI is provided together with perfor-
mance-based instead of flat wage compensation. Particularly,
neither an additive effect nor a positive interaction effect
can be identified with respect to the motivational impact of
performance-based compensation predicted by agency the-
ory.188 By contrast, results of the median regression suggest
that unidimensional RPI significantly negatively interacts
with the application of performance-based pay while its over-
all performance effect still stays considerably positively. With
regard to the reasons of this discrepancy between the theo-
retical prediction and the experimental results, it is firstly of
interest if there are unexpected differences in participants’
attention towards task dimensions when unidimensional RPI
is provided together with performance-based instead of flat
wage compensation. Indeed, the bivariate analysis indicates
a significant increase in the mean difficulty level under a
performance-based contract. However, the corresponding
interaction term in the regression analysis on attention to-
wards task dimensions is nearly zero and insignificant. In this
context, additional tests reveal that the result of the bivariate
analysis is strongly driven by two observations in the data set
which relate to participants with an average difficulty level
between 5.5 and 6.0.189 Notably, the same participants also
188The graphical comparison of mean performance values in Figure 1 in
section 5.1.1 originally suggested an additive effect. However, this effect
on mean performance did not hold under an OLS regression which included
control variables. The median performance values already indicated in 5.1.1
a decrease of performance which was confirmed in the median regression.
189When the observations are excluded from the data set, neither the Mann-
Whitney test nor the Pearson Chi-Squared test indicate significant differences
between the average difficulty level under perf.-based and flat wage compen-
sation (p=0.22 / 0.39)
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achieved above-average performance190 and further analyses
show that an increase in the average difficulty level under
performance-based compensation can be mostly attributed
to high performing participants.191 Therefore, it appears that
the introduction of performance-based compensation is not
associated with an undesirable distortion in attention allo-
cation under unidimensional RPI which might have impede
performance improvements.
Importantly, the distribution of performance under uni-
dimensional RPI suggests that the application of a perfor-
mance-based contract has actually resulted in a positive
effect with regard to high performing participants.192 Also,
the presence of extreme upward outlying observations un-
der the performance-based scheme may be an indication
that the predicted motivational effect of financial incentives
has pushed participants with high ability to achieve maxi-
mum performance.193 With respect to the participants with
below-average performance, it should be emphasized that
the nature of the applied task implies that the relationship be-
tween effort and performance is moderated by participants’
cognitive abilities. Particularly, performance improvements
through higher motivation under performance-based com-
pensation are limited based on participants’ ability to solve
multiplication problems.194 In this regard, performance-
based compensation may have only positively affected per-
formance of participants that did not receive RPI since the
provision of RPI already improved performance under a flat
wage contract which is why there might have been no much
more room for improvement.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the application
of a variable payment increases the performance pressure
inherent in the setting which might be critical in conjunction
with the competitive pressure induced by RPI. Notably, it
could have resulted in a so called ‘choking under pressure’
effect which refers to the occurrence of inferior performance
under pressure circumstances.195 In this context, Beilock
et al. (2004) demonstrate that pressure induced by mone-
tary rewards harms performance in mathematical problem
solving which requires heavy working memory such as mul-
tiplication tasks.196 In the experimental setting, especially
participants with below-average performance could have
190The related participants achieved a total number of points of 602 (diffi-
culty level 6.0) and 396 (difficulty level 5.7).
191When the sample is restricted to participants that perform above the
mean of their treatment, mean /median difficulty levels are the following:
Perf.-based: 3.82 / 3.56; Flat wage: 2.74 / 2.49. The difference is not sig-
nificant (p=0.18 / 0.52).
192When the sample is restricted to participants that perform above the
mean of their treatment, mean /median performance is the following: Perf.-
based: 629.29 / 492; Flat wage: 453.42 / 389. The difference is not signif-
icant (p=0.12 /0.11).
193The extreme outlying observations relate to 2 participants with total
points of 827 (IQR: 3.28) and 1312 (IQR: 6.79).
194Prior literature commonly argues that the positive performance effect of
financial incentives predicted by agency theory is limited when tasks involve
cognitive performance, cf. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002), p. 320; Camerer
and Hogarth (1999); Rydval and Ortmann (2004).
195Cf. Baumeister (1984), p. 610; Ariely et al. (2009).
196Beilock et al. (2004) relates this finding to distraction theories which
been affected by ‘choking under pressure’ since perceived
pressure might increase through a low ranking position as
well as the threat that monetary earnings are falling short
of expectations.197 However, additional analysis on the par-
ticipants’ mistake share and on the average time required to
solve a problem of a certain difficulty level do not further
underpin this supposition.198
Differences between the effects of unidimensional and multidi-
mensional RPI on performance and attention towards task di-
mensions (RQ1a, RQ1b, RQ2a, RQ2b)
Besides the formulated hypotheses, the study has developed
two-tailed research questions so as to address its objective
of comparing the performance and attention allocation ef-
fects of unidimensional RPI with that of multidimensional
RPI. Research question RQ2a is concerned with performance
differences. Firstly, the bivariate as well as the multivariate
analyses do not find a significant variation between the per-
formance effects of the two forms of RPI. Yet, there is also no
evidence for a significant positive performance effect of mul-
tidimensional RPI unless the regression analysis considers
its interaction effects with the applied compensation scheme
and the overall ranking position of the participants. Similar
to unidimensional RPI, the results of the median regression
reveal a significant negative interaction between multidi-
mensional RPI and performance-based pay.199 Importantly,
however, the overall effect of multidimensional RPI under
performance-based compensation is therefore nearly zero
while unidimensional RPI still induces a remarkable perfor-
mance increase. Regarding research question RQ2b, this
complies with the finding of the bivariate analyses that me-
dian performance significantly differs between the two forms
of RPI in the presence of a performance-based contract.
In order to interpret the described performance effects,
potential differences in attention towards task dimensions
between unidimensional and multidimensional RPI have to
be considered. In relation to research question RQ1a, the
analyses overall indicate that the average difficulty level un-
der the two forms of RPI is not significantly different which
corresponds to the results on the performance effects. Fur-
ther on, the introduction of performance-based compensa-
tion seem to differently affect the average difficulty level
reached in the presence of unidimensional and multidimen-
sional RPI. More concretely, the regression analysis reveals
a negative interaction effect between multidimensional RPI
propose that pressure increases thoughts about the situation and its impor-
tance which reduce the capacity of the working memory that is available for
the execution of the task.
197Commonly, participants in the experimental laboratory MELESSA expect
to earn between 10 and 15 Euro per hour of participation. Since the show-
up fee accounts for 4 Euro, participants had to achieve 300 points in order
to assure that they earn at least 10 Euro in the experiment. (The earn- ings
from the risk game are not disclosed until the end of the experiment and
could have been in the minimum only 0.1 Euro.)
198Mistake share: (Number of incorrect answers)/ (Sum of number of cor-
rect and incorrect answers per difficulty level).
199As shown in section 5.1.2, the interaction effects are not significantly
different from each other.
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and performance-based compensation and implies an over-
all decrease of the average difficulty level in comparison to
the treatment that do not involve RPI. This contrasts with the
very small and positive interaction between unidimensional
RPI and performance-based pay. However, with respect to
RQ1b, the effects of multidimensional RPI on attention to-
wards task dimension are not statistically significant and nei-
ther is the difference between the interaction terms of the two
forms of RPI with performance-based compensation.
From a theoretical perspective, it was outlined that mul-
tidimensional as compared to unidimensional RPI may dif-
ferently affect attention allocation and performance because
it do not limit peer comparisons to the overall performance
measure which can promote learning but also motivate a dis-
tortion of attention. In the presence of performance-based
compensation, the rewarding of overall performance were
expected to weaken potential attention distortion effects and
to strengthen the impact of learning benefits. Therefore, it
surprises that negative performance effects of multidimen-
sional RPI are present under performance-based compensa-
tion but not when a flat wage is applied. More in-depth
analyses reveal that the decrease in performance between
the two compensation contracts do not hold with regard to
high performing participants which complies with the find-
ings on unidimensional RPI.200 Also, it can be shown that
the increase in the average difficulty level suggested by the
mean values, which opposes the indication of the median val-
ues and the regression results, can be attributed to those high
performing participants.201 In this context, a potential atten-
tion distortion towards the ‘quantity’ dimension of the task
for participants performing below the treatment mean is fur-
ther investigated. Notably, with respect to participants that
achieved rank one or two in the ‘quantity’ ranking of their
group, overall performance is considerably lower for multi-
dimensional RPI under performance-based as compared to
flat wage compensation. Also, the performance under both
compensation contracts falls short to what is achieved by the
top two performers of the ‘quantity’ ranking under unidimen-
sional RPI.202 This may indicate that participants provided
200When the sample is restricted to participants that perform above the
mean of their treatment, mean /median performance is the following: Perf.-
based: 517.63 / 447.5; Flat: 455.9 / 420.5. The difference is not significant
(p=0.93 /1.00). Similarly to unidimensional RPI, the sample on perf.- based
compensation also includes an extreme outlying observation. The related
participant achieved a total number of points of 1217 (IQR: 6.38).
201When the sample is restricted to participants that perform above the
mean of their treatment, mean /median difficulty levels are the following:
Perf.-based: 3.23 / 2.76; Flat: 3.02 / 2.64. The dif- ference is not signifi-
cant (p=0.96 / 1.00). The distribution under perf.-based compensation in-
cludes two outlying observation related to participants with an average dif-
ficulty level of 4.71 (IQR: 2.16) and 6.0 (IQR: 3.81). The same participants
also represent the two outlying observa- tions on performance. However,
performance as well as the average difficulty are for both partici- pants that
perform above and below the mean still considerably higher under unidi-
mensional RPI and perf.-based compensation.
202Mean and median performance is as follows: Multidimensional RPI: 1)
Flat: 322.7 / 327.5, Perf.- based: 296.9 / 303.5; Unidimensional RPI: 1)
Flat: 363 / 354, Perf.-based: 354 / 311. The differences are not significant
(all p>0.37).
with multidimensional RPI concentrate on the ‘quantity’ di-
mension of the task at the expense of overall performance, es-
pecially under performance-based compensation. However,
the differences between the treatments are not significant
and it appears that the performance decrease under multidi-
mensional RPI in the presence of a performance-based con-
tract might be also strengthened by further determinants.
As already mentioned before, the performance pressure
inherent to a task setting is increased by the provision of
RPI as well as by the application of a performance-based
contract. Therefore, performance deteriorations of partici-
pants that are exposed to both forms of pressure might be
linked to a ‘choking under pressure’ effect. In contrast to
unidimensional RPI, additional analyses on the average time
that participants under multidimensional RPI have required
to solve a problem of a certain difficulty level provide some
support for this supposition. Specifically, it can be shown that
participants provided with performance-based compensation
have spent more time on problems of all difficulty levels in
comparison to those that received a flat wage. Notably, the
differences between the compensation contracts are signifi-
cant for difficulty level 1 and 2 when outliers are excluded
from the sample.203 Based on this finding, it may be ar-
gued that the provision of performance-based compensation
increases pressure more under multidimensional RPI than
under unidimensional RPI. From a theoretical perspective,
this could be explained by the additional cognitive effort
that is required when individuals have to solve trade-offs
between the potentially conflicting motives induced by in
the rewarding of overall performance and the facilitation of
competition on dimension-specific performance measures.204
The effects of unidimensional and multidimensional RPI on per-
formance and attention towards task dimensions of low ranked
participants
Lastly, with regard to the overall performance effects of unidi-
mensional and multidimensional RPI, the regression analysis
reveals significant negative interactions between both forms
of RPI and the overall ranking position of the participants.205
In particular, the size of the effects of the OLS regression indi-
cate that the performance of low ranked participants overall
decreases when they are provided with either form of RPI. In
203Mean and median time values: Difficulty level 1) Flat: 9.42 / 8.23;
Perf.-based: 11.36 / 10.48 (p=0.24 / 0.04); Difficulty level 2) Flat: 10.59
/ 10.25; Perf.-based: 13.64 / 12.57 (p=0.04 / 0.14). The differences in
the time values are not expected to be driven by different abilities since the
treatments do not differ in their share of students majoring in a math-related
field of study and since the first two difficulty levels only require basic math
skills. There are no significant differ- ences in the average mistake shares
per difficulty level.
204Cf. Payne et al. (1993), p. 30; Hogarth (1987).
205As shown in section 5.1.2, the interaction effects are not significantly
different from each other. It should be emphasized that low ranked partici-
pants are not necessarily below-average performers of their treatment since
the participants compete in groups of five while each treatment is applied to
25 participants in total. Therefore, the study compares the overall effect of
the two forms of RPI with regard to low ranked participants and disentangles
effects between above and below-average performers only in the context of
the application of different compensation schemes.
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the median regression, this only applies to multidimensional
RPI.206 In interpreting these findings, it should be referred
to the insight of social comparison theory that comparisons
with superior others can be on the one the hand inspiring
and spur the motivation for performance improvement but
may also adversely affect self-evaluation and promote nega-
tive feelings of inferiority. As outlined earlier in section 2.1.1,
the latter is expected to occur when a comparison implies a
contrastive evaluation of the comparison target which em-
phasizes the individual’s separation toward it.207 More con-
cretely, comparison standards are perceived to be not attain-
able which might have applied to the participants of the ex-
periment which experienced a ranking position below the top
three ranks.
In the described context, peer comparisons can firstly
decrease task motivation and provoke defensive reactions
which can result in lower effort and deteriorating perfor-
mance.208 Secondly, threatening upward comparisons can
lower self-efficacy beliefs and therefore cause a devotion of
cognitive effort towards activities that are unrelated to task
execution such as worrying about the own performance and
interpreting the ranking outcome.209 Here, prior experi-
mental studies show that the behavioural responses can also
include inconsistent changes of task strategies and the adop-
tion of risky strategies.210 With regard to the performance
decrease of the low ranked participants in the conducted
experiment, some evidence is found with regard to the sec-
ond explanation. Particularly, the responses to the post-
experimental questionnaire indicate that low ranked as com-
pared to high ranked participants were more nervous about
their rank and perceived that thinking about their rank in-
terfered to a greater extent with their performance (p=0.02,
p=0.08).211 Also, it appears that low ranked participants
changed their task strategy more often during the experiment
since the number of changes in the average difficulty level be-
tween the rounds is significantly greater in comparison with
206As mentioned before, the data on unidimensional RPI include a down-
ward outlying observation which relates to a low ranked participant (per-
formance: 23 points, IQR: -1.80).
207Cf. Festinger (1954); Suls et al. (2002); Corcoran et al. (2011); Tesser
(1988).
208Cf. Corcoran et al. (2011); Stapel and Schwinghammer (2004). De-
fensive reactions may include e.g. that individuals question the relevance
of the performance dimension, search for differences be- tween themselves
and the comparison target or try to self-affirm their competencies in another
area.
209Cf. Bandura (1977b); Bandura/Wood (1989).
210Cf. Hannan et al. (2008); Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
211Participants had to indicate rank nervousness and interference using a
seven-point Likert scale (1=not at all, 7=to a great degree). The questions
are adapted from Tafkov (2013). See Online-Appendix 5 for the questions
of the post-experimental questionnaire. Based on the answers, continuous
varia- bles are created. Mean values: Rank nervousness - Low rank: 3.18
- High rank: 2.35; Rank inter- ference - Low rank: 2.83 - High rank: 2.15.
P-values are derived from a Mann-Whitney test. The comparison is limited
to participants that received RPI (unidimensional or multidimensional RPI).
There are no significant differences in the responses of low and high ranked
participants that were not provided with RPI (and therefore did not know
their ranking position).
high ranked participants (p=0.01).212 Moreover, it can be
shown that the share of incorrect answers on the total num-
ber of answers is significantly higher for low ranked partic-
ipants (p=0.00).213 In this context, they have also required
significantly more time to solve problems of difficulty level
one to five (all p<0.00).214 However, this can be as well an
indication for decreases in the effort level due to a loss of
motivation.
As mentioned before, the regression results indicate that
the negative performance effect of the provision of RPI on low
ranked participants appears to be specifically emphasized un-
der multidimensional RPI. This result may be interpreted
in two different ways. First, participants that are provided
with multidimensional RPI have the opportunity to reduce
the self-threating effect induced by a negative social com-
parison on overall performance through the affirmation of
their competencies in one of the task dimensions. Therefore,
the predictions derived from self-affirmation theory with re-
gard to potential attention distortion effects under multidi-
mensional RPI might be especially relevant for low ranked
participants.215 In this regard, the interaction term included
in the regression analysis on attention towards task dimen-
sions indicates a decrease in the average difficulty level of
low ranked participants. However, the effect is not signifi-
cant and additional analyses show that there are is also no
difference between the two forms of RPI regarding the num-
ber of low ranked participants that achieved a high rank in
the ‘quantity’ or the ‘value’ dimension of the task.216 Notably,
the regression results disclose a significant negative interac-
tion between unidimensional RPI and the average difficulty
level of low ranked participants. This might be explained by
decreased motivation and a lower effort level since tasks of
lower difficulty require less cognitive effort and the provi-
sion of unidimensional RPI does not involve potential incen-
tives for a distortion of attention towards one task dimension.
Indeed, it can be demonstrated that the significant effect is
driven by two participants with a considerably low respec-
tively downward outlying overall performance.217
Apart from that, multidimensional RPI may have an in-
creased negative impact on the performance of low ranked
212Mean number of changes in the average difficulty level: Low rank: 1.13
– High rank: 0.63. P-values are derived from a Mann-Whitney test. The
changes are counted from one period to another and relate to an increase or
a decrease of the average difficulty level of at least one level (e.g. a change
from difficulty level 2.0 to 3.1 between period 2 and 3 is counted as one
change).
213Mean values on mistake share: Low rank - 18.75% - High rank: 27.56%.
P-values are derived from a Mann-Whitney test.
214Low ranked participants have also required more time to solve problems
of difficulty level six but the difference is not significant since there are only
6 observations as compared to 22 observations for high ranked participants.
P-values are derived from a Mann-Whitney test.
215Cf. Steele (1988); Aronson et al. (1999).
216The tests were conducted with different definitions of ‘high rank’: Rank
1; Rank 1 or 2; Rank 1, 2 or 3.
217The mean difficulty level of low ranked participants under unidimen-
sional RPI equals 2.53. In contrast, the two participants reached an average
difficulty level of 1.86 (performance: 87 points) and 1.5 (performance: 23
points, IQR: -1.80).
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participants as it can strengthen adverse effects on self-
evaluation. More concretely, it potentially involves negative
social comparison experiences in different competence areas.
This can be illustrated by the finding that nearly all of the
overall low ranked participants were also confronted with a
low rank regarding their dimension-specific performance.218
Therefore, it could be argued that multidimensional RPI
as compared to unidimensional RPI potentially reinforces
negative effects on task motivation and self-efficacy beliefs.
Particularly, low ranked participants may have exerted less
effort because of decreased motivation since there are no
significant differences between the two forms of RPI with
regard to strategy changes, mistake share, rank nervousness
and interference as well as time required to solve problems
of certain difficulty levels.
5.2. Supplemental analyses
5.2.1. Development of performance and attention towards task
dimensions over time
In the previous chapter, tests of hypotheses and re-
search questions have used data pooled across the six
rounds of the experiment. In order to extend the provided
insights on the effects of the experimental manipulations,
this section considers how the primary dependent variables
performance and attention towards task dimensions have
developed over time.
Figure 3 shows the time path of the mean performance
of participants by round in all treatments. The graph illus-
trates that performance differences based on the presence
and the dimensionality of RPI already exist in the first round
before the participants in the related treatments actually
receive RPI. This finding is consistent with previous exper-
imental studies which show that individuals anticipate the
potential effect of RPI on their self-evaluation and there-
fore respond accordingly.219 In particular, when the per-
formance means are pooled across compensation contracts,
they correspond to the results on overall mean performance.
Participants’ number of points is significantly higher when
they are provided with unidimensional RPI (p=0.08) while
the positive effect of multidimensional RPI is not signifi-
cant (p=0.25).220 However, initially there seem to be no
differences between the applied compensation schemes ex-
cept for a slightly higher level of performance when mul-
tidimensional RPI is combined with a flat wage instead of
performance-based contract. The moderating influence of
the compensation contract under multidimensional RPI ap-
pears to strengthen in the following rounds which implies
21816 out of 20 overall low ranked participants under multidimensional
RPI were also low ranked on either the ‘quantity’ or the ‘value’ dimension
of the task (rank 4 or 5). Two low ranked participants even received a low
rank on both task dimensions.
219Cf. Tafkov (2013); Hannan et al. (2013).
220P-values are derived from a Mann-Whitney test. The same result can
be obtained from a Pearson Chi-Squared test with regard to median perfor-
mance (p=0.07, p=0.23). No significant difference in performance can be
found between unidimensional and multidimensional RPI in the first round.
that mean performance is constantly lower in the presence of
a performance-based as compared to a flat wage scheme.221
This insight underpins the results of the previous analyses
regarding a negative interaction effect between multidimen-
sional RPI and performance-based compensation.
In contrast to the described differences between the com-
pensation contracts under multidimensional RPI, Figure 3
suggests that performance is after the first round consistently
higher in the presence of a performance-based scheme when
participants receive unidimensional RPI or no RPI. Further
analyses indicate that median performance under unidimen-
sional RPI is higher for flat wage compensation in the first
two rounds of the experiment which may explain the nega-
tive interaction effect implied by overall median performance
and the regression results.222 The evolution of performance
therefore indicates that negative influences of performance-
based compensation are relevant in the early rounds while
its predicted motivational effects appear to manifest itself in
higher performance towards the end of the experiment. This
finding could be explained by an increase in practice on the
basic multiplication tables that are needed to solve problems
of all difficulty levels since this potentially reduces perfor-
mance declines because of ‘choking under pressure’. Specif-
ically, Beilock et al. (2004) argues that ‘choking under pres-
sure’ may be eliminated in mathematical problem solving as
individuals gain practice and can therefore retrieve partial
solutions from memory.223 Importantly, yet, such a counter-
vailing effect of practice on potential ‘choking under pressure’
in the presence of performance-based compensation cannot
be observed with regard to multidimensional RPI.
Overall, the development of performance under unidi-
mensional RPI and performance-based compensation is char-
acterized by some volatility over the first three rounds and a
steady increase with regard to the following rounds. Under
the flat wage scheme, the development appears to more sta-
ble with a slight rise of performance over time. By contrast,
the graphs show considerable volatility in performance over
all six rounds when participants do not receive RPI or are
provided with multidimensional RPI. Remarkably, for both
manipulations, the evolution under the two compensation
contracts follows the same pattern even though on different
total performance levels. Furthermore, there is no consid-
erable directional difference in the evolution of performance
under the treatments which do not involve and those that ap-
ply multidimensional RPI. The only exception applies to the
last round in which the performance under multidimensional
slightly decreases while there is a substantially rise for the
performance of participants that are not provided with RPI.
This result also holds for median performance and can indi-
221Based on the Mann-Whitney test, there is no significant difference in
performance under the two compensation contracts in all rounds. Yet, with
regard to median performance, the Pearson Chi-Squared test indicates a sig-
nificant positive effect under a flat wage in round three and four (p=0.05,
p=0.09).
222There is no significant difference in performance between the two com-
pensation contracts in all rounds.
223Cf. Beilock et al. (2004).
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Figure 3: Development of Performance over Periods (Means by Treatment)
cate a loss of motivation for participants under multidimen-
sional RPI. Since the provided rankings did not compare cur-
rent period performance but cumulative performance, they
may have not seen the chance to improve their position in the
ranking in the last period. Lastly, the development of perfor-
mance in all treatments reflects an overall increase from the
first to the last period which can be related to training and
learning effects.224
Figure 4 displays the evolution of the mean values per
treatment for participants’ average difficulty level over all
six rounds of the experiment. Broadly, the graphs indicate
for nearly all treatments that the average difficulty level
constantly fluctuate around a certain baseline with over-
all changes of no more than 0.58 difficulty level. The only
exception is the treatment that does not involve RPI and
applies a flat wage since it shows a decrease of 0.84 diffi-
culty levels from the first to the fourth round. While the
average difficulty level is initially similar between the two
compensation contracts when participants do not receive
RPI, this reduction causes an increasing difference since the
average difficulty level under performance-based compensa-
tion shows a relatively low fluctuation.225 The development
partly complies with the results on performance which show
similarity in the first round and a consistently higher level
of performance under performance-based compensation in
the following rounds. Specifically, it appears that participants
provided with a flat wage cannot realize similar performance
improvements with the lower difficulty level as those that re-
ceive performance-based contract and stay with the higher
difficulty level. A possible reason for the decrease of the
224The greatest increases occurred under No RPI/Perf.-based and Unidi-
mensional RPI/Perf.-based. The differences in the mean performance val-
ues between the first and last period equal 16.36 and 15.96. For the other
treatments, the differences are all below 7.96.
225The average difficulty level is significantly higher in round four
(p=0.05), five (p=0.05) and six (0.01). The Pearson Chi-Squared test indi-
cates a median difference in round six (p=0.05).
average difficulty level under flat wage compensation may
be the lower level of motivation since solving problems of
lower difficulty level requires less cognitive effort.
With regard to the evolution of attention towards task
dimensions under unidimensional RPI, Figure 4 first of all
shows that the average difficulty level of participants under
performance-based compensation is over the whole time the
highest among all treatments. Thus, it is from the beginning
constantly higher than the average difficulty level under uni-
dimensional RPI and flat wage compensation even though
first round performance is similar between both compensa-
tion contracts.226 Notably, the average difficulty level un-
der both compensation schemes fluctuates in the same pat-
tern and seem to be unrelated to the presented stable perfor-
mance development in the latter rounds of the experiment.
Unlike the development under unidimensional RPI, the av-
erage difficulty level of participants provided with multidi-
mensional RPI evolves around a comparable baseline under
the two compensation contracts. However, while the mean
of changes in the average difficulty level over time is low-
est for participants provided with a flat wage as compared to
all other treatments, there is a considerable volatility under
a performance-based scheme.227 The differences in the de-
velopment of the average difficulty level are not reflected in
the previously shown similar pattern of the evolution of per-
formance under the two compensation contracts. Neverthe-
less, they might be related to the overall higher performance
level under a flat wage scheme. Finally, a comparison be-
tween the evolution of the average difficulty level over time
under multidimensional RPI as compared to unidimensional
RPI provides no substantiation on differences in learning ef-
fects. In this regard, especially the behavioural responses to
226The average difficulty level is significantly higher in round one (p=0.04)
and three (p=0.04). The Pearson Chi-Squared test indicates a median dif-
ference in round three (p=0.05).
227Mean number of changes in the average difficulty level: 1.0. In the
remaining treatments, the mean is below 0.88.
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Figure 4: Development of Difficulty Level over Periods (Means by Treatment)
the provision of RPI in the first round may be relevant which
though do not indicate improved adjustments of the average
difficulty level under multidimensional RPI.
5.2.2. Post-Experimental questionnaire data
In addition to the observed primary dependent variables
of the experiment, post-experimental questionnaire data are
used to provide some further insights into the effects of uni-
dimensional and multidimensional RPI.228 Specifically, it is
examined how participants’ ranking position relates to their
indicated feelings of pride and shame and whether there is
a connection between the dimensionality of RPI and state-
ments regarding the development and the use of task-specific
strategies.
In the course of the discussion of the results in section
5.1.3, it was argued that social comparison information can
adversely affect self-evaluation of low ranked participants
and foster negative feelings of inferiority based on a con-
trastive evaluation of the comparison target. In this context,
the data of the post-experimental questionnaire allow to
investigate whether participants’ position in the rankings
created feelings of pride and shame. Using a seven-point
Likert scale, participants had to assess how pride they felt
about their own performance (1=not at all, 7=to a great
degree).229 With regard to the theoretical predictions, it is
expected that the continuous variable for participants’ to-
tal rank is negatively related to the variable that reflects
pride since a smaller rank number constitutes better relative
performance. Additional analyses support this supposition
since they show that total rank and pride are significantly
negatively correlated for both participants that were pro-
vided with unidimensional and multidimensional RPI (r=
-0.69, p=0.00; r= -0.75, p=0.00).230 It appears that there
228See Online-Appendix 5 for the questions of the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire.
229The question is adapted from Tafkov (2013).
230Regarding the additional rankings provided under multidimensional
is a stronger negative correlation for multidimensional RPI
which could be an indication for a strengthening of adverse
effects on self-evaluation when participants potentially ex-
perience negative social comparison experiences in different
competence areas. However, a test on the equality of the
correlation coefficients reveals that there is no significant
difference. Importantly, no correlation is found for partici-
pants that did not receive any form of RPI and were therefore
not aware about differences between their own performances
and that of their peers.
Apart from that, the post-experimental questionnaire was
also used to ask participants about the task strategy that
they adopted during the experiment as well as the usefulness
of the provided ranking information for finding an optimal
strategy. In this regard, it has been hypothesized in the anal-
ysis on the behavioural effects of RPI in section 2.1 that mul-
tidimensional RPI is more beneficial for learning processes on
task strategies than unidimensional RPI. However, so far, the
analyses on the observed primary dependent variables did
not indicate differences in learning effects between the two
forms of RPI. Notably, the post-experimental questionnaire
data suggest that multidimensional RPI in general increased
the application of a task-specific strategy as compared to
unidimensional RPI. More concretely, the number of partici-
pants that constituted in the questionnaire that they have not
followed any strategy during task execution is significantly
higher under unidimensional RPI (p=0.09).231 Nevertheless,
the questionnaire data show that participants which received
multidimensional RPI did not perceive the ranking informa-
RPI, a significant correlation can be found between pride and the final po-
sition in the ‘value’ ranking (r=-0.47, p=0.00). How- ever, it appears that
this is driven by a significant positive correlation between overall rank and
‘value’ rank (r=0.48, p=0.00).
231Participants where asked which strategy they have adopted during task
execution and had to choose between the options ‘Value Strategy’, ‘Quantity
Strategy’, ‘No Strategy’ or ‘Other Strategy’ In case of a choice of ‘Other Strat-
egy’, the applied strategy had to be specified. Percentage of participants that
chose ‘No Strategy’: 1) Unidimensional RPI: 20%; 2) Multidimensional RPI:
8%.
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tion to be more useful for strategy development than those
that were provided with unidimensional RPI.232 In addition,
there appear to be no differences in the evaluation between
the two compensation schemes that were applied with mul-
tidimensional RPI. Overall, the participants’ average assess-
ment of the usefulness equaled 3.45 (s.d.=2.01) on a seven
point Likert scale (1=not at all; 7=to a great degree).
6. Conclusion
The provision of RPI is an important ingredient in the
‘gamification’ of tasks and is commonly used by firms to in-
crease the performance of their employees. In case employ-
ees have to fulfil tasks that involve multiple dimensions, firms
have to decide on the dimensionality of RPI and can basically
choose between unidimensional and multidimensional RPI.
However, little is known about the potential cost and benefits
of the provision of different forms of RPI in multidimensional
task settings in which overall performance is not only deter-
mined by the motivated level of effort but also by the induced
attention towards task dimensions. Against this background,
the present study has conceptually analysed behavioural ef-
fects of unidimensional and multidimensional RPI under dif-
ferent compensation schemes. On this basis, it has applied
a controlled laboratory experiment to empirically test the in-
fluence of the dimensionality of RPI on performance and at-
tention towards task dimensions.
In sum, the study demonstrates that solely the provision
of unidimensional RPI improves performance in multidimen-
sional task settings while the effects for multidimensional
RPI are small and insignificant. Importantly, both unidi-
mensional and multidimensional RPI imply a negative effect
on the performance of participants with a low position in
the provided ranking on overall performance. Additionally,
the application of performance-based compensation nega-
tively moderates the performance impact of both forms of
RPI which though seem to be especially critical for multidi-
mensional RPI. In this regard, multidimensional RPI induces
a significant performance decrease compared to unidimen-
sional RPI in the presence of a performance-based contract.
The findings provide some indication that a distortion of
attention toward the ‘quantity’ dimension of the applied ex-
perimental task may have caused the negative performance
effect. Notably, the experimental results do not indicate
increased learning effects regarding a task-specific strategy
under multidimensional as compared to unidimensional RPI.
Overall, no significant differences in attention towards task
dimensions between the two forms of RPI can be proved.
The findings of the study extend the stream of literature
that investigates the motivational influence of RPI in task
settings with one relevant performance dimension since it
enhances the understanding of the effects of RPI in multi-
dimensional task setting. Furthermore, it involves practical
232There is also no correlation between the perceived usefulness of the
ranking information and the performance of the participants under the two
forms of RPI.
implications for the use of RPI in firms which employ mul-
tidimensional tasks and have no certain preferences on em-
ployees’ attention towards task dimensions but rather aim
to maximize overall performance. Based on the study’s re-
sults, it appears to be not beneficial to rank employees based
on their dimension-specific performance. In this regard, fea-
tures of ‘gamification’ platforms like the possibility to provide
employees with symbolic badges for the mastery of different
performance dimensions should be used with care.233 Also,
the study emphasizes that firms should not separate the de-
cisions on the implementation of RPI and the use of financial
incentives but have to jointly consider possible effects on the
motivation of their workforce. Moreover, it is of special rele-
vance regarding the growing adaption of ‘gamification’ plat-
forms that firms are aware that the provision of RPI can come
at the cost of demotivating low ranked employees.
The results of the present study are subject to a number
of limitations. As already outlined in chapter 4.1, the gener-
alizability of findings obtained from laboratory experiments
is an essential concern.234 First, results are drawn from a
small and homogenous sample of 150 student participants.
Second, anonymity was preserved during the experiment and
therefore participants did not know how the fictional names
used in the rankings matched to the actual persons in the
laboratory. This may have lowered the strength of social
comparison involvement compared to a workplace context in
which colleagues know each other and where ‘gamification’
leaderboards commonly show photos of employees next to
their rank.235 Also, a lack of identification and psychologi-
cal closeness to the comparison targets may have promoted
the salience of a personal self in opposition to a social self
which can enforce negative feelings and demotivation for low
ranked participants.236 Third, the applied experimental task
enables a clear test of the underlying theory but is not reflec-
tive for multidimensional tasks in the real world as it does not
capture all higher-order capabilities and task strategy consid-
erations that might be required from employees to perform
well in their jobs. Lastly, in general, it has to be emphasized
that the experimental data include various (extreme) outly-
ing observations which reduce the robustness of the results.
Overall, the findings of the study suggest various avenues
for further research. Future investigations could shed light
on the indicated moderating influence of the applied com-
pensation scheme on the performance effects of RPI in mul-
tidimensional task settings. In this context, it seems to be
of interest to explore further determinants of varying per-
formance under the two forms of RPI apart from potential
differences in attention towards task dimensions. Especially,
potential ‘choking under pressure’ in the presence of multidi-
mensional RPI may receive attention in connection with the
cognitive effects of trade-offs faced by employees when fi-
nancial rewards are tied to overall performance while compe-
233Cf. Werbach and Hunter (2012); The Economist (2012b)
234Cf. Loewenstein (1999); Schnell et al. (2008).
235Cf. Werbach and Hunter (2012); Bunchball.
236Cf. Stapel and Koomen (2005); Corcoran et al. (2011).
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tition is facilitated on dimension-specific performance mea-
sures. As it was outlined earlier, ‘choking under pressure’ is a
frequent phenomenon in mathematical problems solving and
therefore, it appears to be important to additionally test ef-
fects with other types of tasks. Furthermore, future research
could investigate in greater depth whether multidimensional
RPI may enhance adverse performance effects for low ranked
employees as it can cause negative social comparison experi-
ences in different competence areas. Finally, since the partici-
pants of the conducted experiment were only informed about
performance ranks but not about performance levels of their
group members, it would be interesting how such additional
information may influence performance as well as attention
allocation under unidimensional and multidimensional RPI.
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